

Kilshaw, Rachael (POL)

From: Marion, Samara (DPA)
Sent: Thursday, January 18, 2018 4:55 PM
To: Kilshaw, Rachael (POL); Melara, Sonia (POL); Turman, Julius (POL); Turman, L. Julius M.; Hing, Bill (POL)
Cc: Adwan, Rania (HRD); Jones, Ryan (POL); Henderson, Paul (DAT)
Subject: DPA's Suggested Recommendations
Attachments: DPALtr_TaserBoardRecommendations.pdf;
DPA_AttachmentsA&B_TaserBoardRecommendations.pdf;
DPA_AttachmentsCD_TaserBoardRecommendations.pdf

Good afternoon: On behalf of Paul Henderson, I've attached DPA's suggested recommendations for the Police Department's proposed Review Board and also Exhibits A-D. Thanks for the opportunity to comment and see you at next Wednesday's meeting.

Best regards,
Samara

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From: Kilshaw, Rachael (POL)
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Cc: Adwan, Rania (HRD) <rania.adwan@sfgov.org>; Jones, Ryan (POL) <ryan.j.jones569@sfgov.org>
Subject: ECD Appendix stakeholder meeting

Good Morning All:

As a reminder, stakeholder comments on the Electronic Control Device Appendix are due to the Commission Office no later than Friday, January 19, 2018 at 12:00 pm.

The draft Appendix and stakeholder comments will be discussed at an ECD stakeholder meeting on Wednesday, January 24th, 2018 from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm at the Public Safety Building, 1245 3rd Street, Room 1025. If you are unable to attend, you can send a designee from your agency.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Rachael

Sergeant Rachael Kilshaw
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DEPARTMENT OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO



January 19, 2018

Paul Henderson
Interim Executive Director

Honorable Julius Turman, President of the San Francisco Police Commission Members, Police Commission

Re: DPA's Suggested Revisions to SFPD's Taser Review Board

Dear President Turman and Commissioners:

This letter is submitted in response to Commissioner Sonia Melara's January 12, 2018 email inviting members of the taser working group to provide comments on the San Francisco Police Department's proposed Taser Review Board. I make the following recommendations:

I. The Proposed Board Should Review All Incidents Involving Taser Activations Instead Of Only Those Resulting In Death Or Serious Injury.

The Department of Police Accountability recommends that the proposed board review all incidents of taser activation to provide a comprehensive evaluation of taser incidents. As defined by the Department's proposed policy, activation occurs when an officer depresses the trigger of the taser causing the firing of the probes or places the weapon on the subject in the drive stun mode. (See Proposed Policy, section II.) By reviewing all incidents of taser activation, the review board would be able to evaluate and monitor taser use not only in the most serious cases but also in those cases where national studies have raised concerns about the overuse or disproportionate use of tasers. For example, the Central Connecticut State University found that in analyzing 2015 taser data from 79 Connecticut police departments, 83% of persons tasered were unarmed, one-third of the individuals subject to being tasered were described as emotionally disturbed, and people of color were more likely to be tasered and less likely to be given a warning before being tasered than whites.¹ A review board that looks at only taser activations resulting in death or serious injury would not be reviewing the vast majority of taser activations.

¹See Central Connecticut State University Report, An Electronic Defense Weapon Analysis and Findings, 2015 <http://www.ccsu.edu/imrp/projects/taser.html>

Moreover, members of the San Francisco public have repeatedly raised concerns about the potential for overuse and disproportionate use of tasers on individuals of color, those in mental health crisis, and other vulnerable populations. Thus, to enhance public confidence in the review board's oversight role, its purview needs to include all taser activations to enable the board to monitor taser use, effectiveness and compliance with the policy across the range of taser incidents. Analyzing all taser activations would enable the review board to monitor and address the public's concern about the overuse or disproportionate use of tasers or the failure to consider other force options. A review board that evaluates all taser activations will be uniquely positioned to make informed policy and training recommendations not only to the Chief but the Police Commission.

2. The Proposed Board Should Review De-Escalation, Tactics And Decision-Making, Supervision, And Equipment Issues In Taser Incidents In Addition To Whether The Use Of Force Was Reasonable.

Under the Police Department's proposal, the Review Board would consider the factors from Department's Use of Force Department General Order to evaluate the reasonableness of the force used. The DPA recommends that pursuant to best practices and similar to other Force Review Boards, such as Seattle Police Department's, other factors be included. The DPA recommends that in addition to whether the force was consistent with SFPD's policy, training and core principles, the Board should review de-escalation, incident supervision, equipment, tactics, training, and policy issues raised by the incident. The DPA also recommends that the Review Board determine whether the Use of Force investigation was thorough and complete. The DPA has provided the Seattle Police Department's Force Review Board report as an example of the types of questions and determinations their review board makes. SPD's Force Review Board makes the following inquiries:

1. Did the officer employ tactics and decision making consistent with policy and training?
2. If it was safe and feasible to do so, did the officer(s) involved take reasonable efforts to de-escalate prior to using force. If no, what might the officer(s) have considered.
3. Was the force used reasonable, necessary and proportional and conform to all policy requirements?
4. Was a supervisor on-scene prior to the force being applied? If yes, did the on-scene supervisor provide the appropriate tactical guidance and support during the force incident? If no, and a supervisor responded to the scene afterwards, were there any identified issues with the on-scene portion of the Use of Force investigation?
5. Was the investigation and review completed within the Department's deadlines for specific types of force investigations. If no, was there an extension approved by a Bureau Chief.
6. Is the investigation complete?
7. Did the chain of command identify any deficiencies in training, performance, equipment or policy issues?

8. Did the Force Review Board identify any additional issues not identified by the Chain of Command?
9. Were there any issues raised or lessons learned during this incident?

The DPA recommends that the Department's proposed Review Board procedures include a Force Review Board report template similar to Seattle Police Department's to facilitate a thorough and consistent review and reporting process.

(See Attachment A, Seattle Police Department's Use of Force Review template report.)

3. The Proposed Board Should Include More Civilian Representatives To Enhance Public Confidence In the Board Review Process.

The Police Department's current proposal includes a Review Board comprised of eight law enforcement officers and two civilians. Five Deputy Chiefs, two Commanding Officers and a designated Taser expert represent law enforcement. A member of the Police Commission and the DPA director are civilians. The DPA recommends that at a minimum three civilians should be included on the board. Chief Scott had previously suggested that a community member sit on the review board.² Increasing the Commission representation to at least two members would enhance the civilian representation. The DPA recommends that the proposed board include more civilian representatives to enhance public confidence in the review process.

4. The Proposed Board's Procedures Should Delineate The Responsibilities Of The Review Board Chair To Enhance Accountability.

The DPA suggests the Department's proposal specifically delineate the role of the Review board chair. The DPA suggests that the board chair's responsibility includes 1) referring policy, equipment and training issues to the appropriate commanders for follow up, 2) maintaining a record of all recommendations and their status, and 3) monitoring the implementation of all recommendations.

5. The Department Should Provide Summaries Of The Taser Cases And The Board Findings And Recommendations To The Police Commission To Enhance Transparency.

The DPA suggests that the Police Department provide summaries of the taser cases and the Board's findings and recommendations to the Police Commission. Summaries of the taser cases in which officer identifying information is redacted and the Board's findings and recommendations will enhance public confidence in the review process. The DPA provides the San Francisco Sheriff Department's Use of Force report that includes summaries of its

² See Chief William Scott's Statement Regarding Conducted Energy Devices for the San Francisco Police Department, page four.

<http://sanfranciscopolice.org/sites/default/files/Documents/PoliceCommission/Chief%20Scotts%20statement%20regarding%20CEDs.pdf>

force incidents as an example of the type of facts that could be provided (see Exhibit B³). The DPA also provides a report from the Seattle Police Department's Force Review Board and the Los Angeles Police Commission's Categorical Use of Force reports⁴ as examples of increased reporting (see Exhibits C and D).

Thank you for the opportunity to comment upon the Department's proposed Review Board. I look forward to further discussion on our agency's recommendations.

Sincerely,



Paul Henderson
Interim Executive Director

attachments

³ San Francisco Sheriff's Administrative Code Chapter 96A Use of Force Second Quarter Report is also available at http://www.sfsheriff.com/files/96A_Q2_2017.pdf.

⁴ See http://www.lapdonline.org/categorical_use_of_force_2015

ATTACHMENT A

**SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT
FORCE REVIEW BOARD**

INCIDENT INFORMATION	
GO:	
Date of Incident:	
Involved Officers/Level of Force:	
Overall Incident Level of Force:	
INVESTIGATION INFORMATION	
Investigating Supervisor:	
Unit: <i>[FIT, SWAT, Precinct]</i>	
Date Chain of Command Review Complete:	
BOARD INFORMATION	
Date of Board:	
Board Chair:	
PRESENTATION OF INVESTIGATION	
FRB Case Presenter:	

Incident Summary:

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A. TACTICS AND DECISION MAKING	
<p>1. Did the officer(s) employ tactics and decision making consistent with:</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">a. Policy? If NO, which non-force policies? (include ICV here) (Use of Force Policy, discuss in next section) <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">b. Training? If NO, what training? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Deferred to pending OPA Investigation</p>	<p>Check all that apply for each officer/issue:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Further Action Needed.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> PAS entry. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to chain of command for counsel. Action requested by FRB:</p>
<p>2. De-escalation:</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">If it was safe and feasible to do so, did the officer(s) involved take reasonable efforts to de-escalate prior to using force? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Not feasible:</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">Describe:</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">If no, what might the officer(s) have considered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decreasing exposure through time, distance, cover, or concealment • Containment of threat or placement of barriers • Verbal persuasion and/or advisements • Listen and Explain with Equity and Dignity (LEED) • Calling resources (CIT, additional officers, less lethal officers) • Other tactics to achieve compliance: <p><input type="checkbox"/> Deferred to pending OPA Investigation</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to training. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA. Specific policy violations referred:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to other _____. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p>Board Analysis & Conclusions:</p>

REVIEW OF TACTICS AND DECISION MAKING: *List By Each Involved Officer*

Administrative Approval: Based on the documentation provided, the tactics and decision-making employed appear to be consistent with policy, and training.

Administrative Disapproval: Based on the documentation provided, the tactics and decision-making employed do not appear to be consistent with policy and training. See above for analysis details.

Name and Serial Number	Approved / Disapproved / Deferred to OPA
1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	
6.	
7.	
8.	
9.	

B. COMPLIANCE WITH SPD USE OF FORCE POLICY

<p>3. Compliance with the SPD Use of Force policy:</p> <p>a. Was the force used Reasonable, Necessary, and Proportional? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No b. Did the force conform to all policy requirements? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>Board Analysis & Conclusions (each involved employee):</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Deferred to pending OPA Investigation</p>	<p>If "No", then:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA. Specific policy violations referred:</p>
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<p>4. Do any of the Use of Force reports need to be re-classified? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>If yes, what reclassifications are needed, and why:</p>	<p>If "YES", then:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Re-classify as Type _____.</p>
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REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE: *List by Each Involved Officer*

Administrative Approval: Based on the documentation provided, the force used was compliant with SPD Use of Force policy.

Administrative Disapproval: Based on the documentation provided, the force used was not compliant with SPD Use of Force policy. See above for analysis details.

Name and Serial Number	Approved / Disapproved / Deferred to OPA
1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	
6.	
7.	

C. SUPERVISION	
<p>5. Was a SPD supervisor(s) on-scene prior to the Force being applied? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>If yes, did the on-scene supervisor(s) provide appropriate tactical guidance and support during the Force incident? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>If no, and a supervisor responded to the scene afterwards, were there any identified issues with the on-scene portion of the Use of Force Investigation? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A</p> <p>Board analysis:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Deferred to pending OPA Investigation</p>	<p>Check all that apply for each supervisor:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Further Action Needed.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> PAS entry. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to chain of command for counsel. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to training. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA. Specific policy violations referred:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to _____. Action requested by FRB:</p>

REVIEW OF INCIDENT SUPERVISION —List by Each Involved supervisor	
<p>Administrative Approval: The review board finds that the supervision and direction of the incident appears to be consistent with policy and training.</p>	
<p>Administrative Disapproval: The review board finds that the supervision and direction of the incident does not appear to be consistent with policy or training. See above for analysis details.</p>	
Name and Serial Number	Approved / Disapproved / Deferred to OPA
1.	
2.	
3.	

D. REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION	
<p>6a. Was the investigation and review completed within 14-days from the date of the incident?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>If No, was there an extension approved by a Bureau Chief? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to _____. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA Specific policy violations referred:</p>
<p>6b. For FIT Cases only:</p> <p>Was the FIT investigation completed within 30-days (90 for an OIS)? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>If no, was there an extension approved by a Bureau Chief? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to _____. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA Specific policy violations referred:</p>
<p>7. Is the investigation complete (i.e. Do we have all material information need to conduct this review and analysis, or were there problems/issues discovered by the FRB?)?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>Board Analysis:</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to _____. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA Specific policy violations referred:</p>
<p>8. Did the Chain of Command identify any deficiencies in training, performance, equipment or policy issues?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sergeant <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A • Admin Lt <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A • Lieutenant <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A • Captain <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A <p>If yes, were such deficiencies properly addressed/referred? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>Describe:</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to _____. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA Specific policy violations referred:</p>
<p>9. Did the Force Review Board identify any additional issues not identified by the Chain of Command? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>If yes, describe (including recommendation(s)/action(s) to be taken):</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to _____. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA Specific policy violations referred:</p>

REVIEW OF INCIDENT REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION:

Administrative Approval: The review board finds that the investigation is thorough and complete. The review board finds that preponderance of the evidence supports the reviewer's determinations.

Administrative Disapproval: The review board finds that the investigation is not thorough and complete or the preponderance of evidence supports the reviewer's determinations. See above for analysis details.

E. OTHER BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS

10. Were there any issues raised or lessons learned during this incident?

Yes No

Describe:

Refer to APRS.

Action requested by FRB:

Refer to Training.

Action requested by FRB:

Refer to Chain of Command.

Action requested by FRB:

Refer to _____.

Action requested by FRB:

NOTES/COMMENTS:				
UOFRB Chair	Date	Print Name	Serial	Unit #
Assistant Chief	Date	Print Name	Serial	Unit #
(Reviewed as to form)				

FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY

Specific Recommendations and Assignments for Follow-Up

1. **OPA referrals**
 - a. Officer name and serial number:
 - b. General reason for referral (for each officer above):
 - c. FRU to initiate referral by direct entry into IA Pro:

2. **Individual officer training recommendations/Individual referrals**
 - a. To whom it is assigned for follow-up:
 - b. What follow-up is requested:
 - c. When a response is due:

3. **Department training recommendations**
 - a. To whom it is assigned for follow-up:
 - b. What follow-up is requested:
 - c. When a response is due:

4. **Policy change or clarification recommendations**
 - a. To whom it is assigned for follow-up:
 - b. What follow-up is requested:
 - c. When a response is due:

5. **Procedure change or clarification recommendations**
 - a. To whom it is assigned for follow-up:
 - b. What follow-up is requested:
 - c. When a response is due:

6. **Equipment recommendations**
 - a. To whom it is assigned for follow-up:
 - b. What follow-up is requested:
 - c. When a response is due:

ATTACHMENT B



**OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO**

1 DR. CARLTON B. GOODLETT PLACE
ROOM 456, CITY HALL
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102



**VICKI L. HENNESSY
SHERIFF**

August 1, 2017
Reference: 2017-091

The Honorable Edwin Lee
Mayor
City Hall, Room 200
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place
San Francisco, CA 94102

Re: Chapter 96A 2017 Second Quarter Report

Dear Mayor Lee,

By San Francisco's Administrative Code Chapter 96A, passed by the Board of Supervisors in October 2015, I am submitting the Sheriff Department's second quarter report of 2017, for the period of April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017. It is the first report required by 96A.3 to include data for encounters, detentions, and traffic stops.

Administrative Code Chapter 96A.1 defines the Sheriff Department's use of force as "use of force on an individual that results in a known injury." By this definition, the Sheriff's Department is including incidents involving the use of pepper spray during a deputy's duties as a known injury since, by policy, Jail Health Services always provides medical treatment. The use of pepper spray to break up fights is usually sufficient and limits serious injury. When it is not available or does not work, reasonable force may be employed.

California Penal Code §834 defines arrests as the "taking of a person into custody, in a case and manner authorized by law." Arrests reported this quarter include individuals who Deputy Sheriffs transported to and booked into County Jail #1, including those picked up for warrants in other counties; those arrested by our deputies on warrants; and also those arrested by the SFSD for on-view charges detected during patrols.

This quarter the Sheriff's Department is reporting 37 uses of force and 135 arrests. Most of the uses of force occurred in our jails resulting from deputies encountering combative inmates.

Phone: 415 554-7225 Fax: 415 554-7050
Website: sfsheriff.com Email: sheriff@sfgov.org

Per 96A.3(d) the department is using the following categories to explain why a deputy Sheriff initiated an arrest, encounter, or traffic stop:


- **Consensual encounter** – *a stop and encounter with an individual who is free to disengage from the interaction at any time*
- **Facility security checkpoint violation** – *failure to comply with, or attempt to enter a facility secured by sheriff's deputies without going through the security checkpoint, or for trying to bring in contraband*
- **Mental health evaluation** – *evaluation of persons who, through their behavior exhibit severe mental health symptoms and behavior that constitutes terms of 5150 W&I*
- **Outstanding arrest warrant** – *identification and arrest of person who has an unbooked warrant*
- **Private person's arrest** – *citizen's arrest affidavit*
- **Probable cause** – *Information of events that legally constitute probable cause for an arrest, search or seizure*
- **Probation or parole** – *wanted for probation or parole violation*
- **Reasonable suspicion** – *information and observable facts indicate a crime has occurred*
- **Released in error** – *human error or misreading of a court document, resulting in the release of the wrong individual from custody*
- **Remanded into custody** – *happens during a court appearance upon the order of a judge or for violating the rules of a treatment program while on sentenced release*
- **Traffic violation** – *on-view observed traffic violation*

The Sheriff's Department is composed of four divisions: Administration and Programs, Planning & Special Projects, Custody Operations, and Field Operations. Three of the divisions have multiple work sites that require staffing 24 hours-a-day, seven days-a-week.

Attached is the Sheriff Department's 2017 second quarter report summarizing our encounters, arrests, and uses of force across all divisions.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact my Chief of Staff, Eileen Hirst, at 415-554-7225.

Sincerely,



Vicki L. Hennessy
Sheriff

Cc: Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board of Supervisors
President Julius Turman, San Francisco Police Commission
Sheryl Davis, Human Rights Commission



**OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO**

1 DR. CARLTON B. GOODLETT PLACE
ROOM 456, CITY HALL
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102



**VICKI L. HENNESSY
SHERIFF**

**San Francisco Sheriff's Department Chapter 96A
Second Quarter Report – April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017**

San Francisco Sheriff's deputies are dedicated to ensuring safety and security to the public as well as to the individuals in our custody. This report contains statistics for arrests, uses of force, encounters resulting in detentions, and encounters resulting in traffic stops by deputy sheriffs.

96A.3(a)(1):

Deputy sheriff encounters

• Total number of encounters	46
○ Administration and Programs Division	00
○ Custody Operations Division	01
○ Field Operations Division	44
○ Off duty encounters	01

For a complete breakdown of encounters by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *TOTAL DEPARTMENT ENCOUNTERS*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on page 20.

96A.3(a)(1) & 96A.3(a)(7):

Encounters resulting in a detention

• Total number of detentions	36
○ Administration and Programs Division	00
○ Custody Operations Division	01
○ Field Operations Division	35
○ Off duty encounters	00

For a complete breakdown of encounters by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *TOTAL DEPARTMENT ENCOUNTERS RESULTING IN A DETENTION*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on page 21.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(a)(1) & 96A.3(a)(7):

Encounters resulting in traffic stops

• Total traffic stops	06
○ Administration and Programs Division	00
○ Custody Operations Division	00
○ Field Operations Division	06

For a complete breakdown of traffic stops by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *TOTAL DEPARTMENT ENCOUNTERS RESULTING IN A TRAFFIC STOP*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on page 22.

96A.3(a)(3):

Total searches conducted by deputy sheriffs during encounters

• Total searches	22
○ Administration and Programs Division	00
○ Custody Operations Division	00
○ Field Operations Division	22

For a complete breakdown of the total searched conducted by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *TOTAL SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY DEPUTY SHERIFFS DURING ENCOUNTERS*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on page 23.

96A.3(a)(4) & 96A.3(a)(7):

Types of searches conducted during detention encounters

• Total searches	22
○ Cursory/Pat/Weapons	21
○ Vehicle search	01

For a complete breakdown of the total types of searches conducted by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *TYPES OF SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY DEPUTY SHERIFFS DURING DETENTIONS*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on page 24.

96A.3(a)(4) & 96A.3(a)(7):

Total searches conducted during traffic stop encounters

- Deputies conducted no searches during the department's six traffic stops.

96A.3(a)(6):

Total dispositions resulting from deputy sheriff encounters

• Total dispositions	46
○ Abated	02
○ Arrests	07
○ Citations	20
○ Detentions	08
○ Medical call	01
○ Report made	02
○ 5150 WI	06

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

For a complete breakdown of the total dispositions resulting from deputy sheriff encounters by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *TOTAL DISPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM DEPUTY SHERIFF ENCOUNTERS*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on pages 25-26.

96A.3(a)(6) & 96A.3(a)(7):

Dispositions of Deputy sheriff initiated detentions

• Total dispositions	36
o Arrests	07
o Citations	14
o Detentions	08
o Medical call	01
o 5150 WI	06

For a complete breakdown of the dispositions resulting from Deputy Sheriff initiated detentions by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *DISPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM DEPUTY SHERIFF DETENTIONS*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on pages 27-28.

96A.3(a)(6) & 96A.3(a)(7):

Dispositions of Deputy sheriff initiated traffic stops

• Total dispositions	06
o Citations	06

For a complete breakdown of the dispositions resulting from deputy sheriff initiated traffic stops by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *DISPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM DEPUTY SHERIFF INITIATED TRAFFIC STOPS*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on page 29.

96A.3(b)(1):

Uses of Force Department-wide

• Total uses of force (department-wide)	37
o Administration and Programs Division	00
o Custody Operations Division	35
o Field Operations Division	02

In some cases, in the course of their normal duties, a sheriff's deputy may use pepper spray to control an inmate who is not responding to verbal commands. Examples include inmate vs. inmate fights and the exhibition of dangerous behavior. When a sheriff's deputy uses pepper spray, it is department policy that the inmate receives immediate treatment for the effects from Jail Health Services.

The 16 instances below are extracted from the total uses of force in the Custody Operations Division and are part of the division's total 35 uses of force.

• Uses of pepper spray only	16
• Uses of pepper spray and additional force	00

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

During the second quarter of 2017, no off duty deputy sheriffs used force, and there were no deaths resulting from a deputy's use of force.

For a complete breakdown of uses of force by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *USES OF FORCE*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on page 30.

96A.3(c)(1):

Arrests

- Total arrests (department-wide) **135**
 - Administration and Programs Division **05**
 - Custody Operations Division **25**
 - Field Operations Division **105**

In the course of their normal duties, sheriff's deputies in the Custody Operations Division arrest individuals who turn themselves in for an outstanding arrest warrant; are transfers to the San Francisco Sheriff's custody from another county; and inmates who commit crimes while in custody.

For a complete breakdown of arrests by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *ARRESTS*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on page 31.

96A.3(d):

Total basis for initiating an encounter

- Total reasons for initiating an encounter **46**
 - Consensual encounter **09**
 - Facility security checkpoint violation **01**
 - Mental health evaluation **05**
 - Outstanding arrest warrant **00**
 - Probable cause **22**
 - Probation or parole **00**
 - Reasonable suspicion **04**
 - Traffic violation **05**

For a complete breakdown of deputy sheriff initiated encounters resulting in a detention by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *TOTAL BASIS FOR INITIATING AN ENCOUNTER*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on pages 32-33.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(d):

Basis for initiating an encounter resulting in a detention

• Total basis for contacts	36
○ Consensual encounter	07
○ Facility security checkpoint violation	01
○ Mental health evaluation	05
○ Outstanding arrest warrant	00
○ Probable cause	19
○ Probation or parole	00
○ Reasonable suspicion	04
○ Traffic violation	00

For a complete breakdown of deputy sheriff initiated encounters resulting in a detention by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *BASIS FOR INITIATING AN ENCOUNTER RESULTING IN A DETENTION*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on pages 34-35.

96A.3(d):

Basis for initiating an encounter resulting in a traffic stop

• Total basis for contacts	06
○ Consensual encounter	00
○ Outstanding arrest warrant	00
○ Mental health evaluation	00
○ Probable cause	01
○ Probation or parole	00
○ Reasonable suspicion	00
○ Facility security checkpoint violation	00
○ Traffic violation	05

For a complete breakdown of Deputy Sheriff initiated encounters resulting in a traffic stop by race, age, and gender: Please see the table titled *BASIS FOR INITIATING AN ENCOUNTER RESULTING IN A TRAFFIC STOP*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on page 36.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017


96A.3(d):

Basis for initiating arrests

• Total basis for initiation an arrest	135
• Consensual encounter	03
• Crime by prisoner	05
• Mental health evaluation	00
• Outstanding arrest warrant	95
• Private persons arrest	02
• Probable cause	25
• Probation or parole	00
• Reasonable suspicion	00
• Release in error	03
• Remanded into custody	01
• Facility security checkpoint violation	01
• Traffic violation	00

For a complete breakdown of deputy sheriff initiated encounters resulting in a traffic stop by Race, Age and Gender: Please see the table titled *BASIS FOR INITIATING AN ARREST*, April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017, on pages 37-38.

Please feel free to contact me with any questions or concerns regarding this report.



Vicki L. Hennessy
Sheriff

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Below are the summaries of the Sheriff's Department's 37 uses of force resulting from 28 incidents during the second quarter of 2017.

Frequently used terms and abbreviations:

Ad-Seg	Administrative Segregation
AWC	Assistant Watch Commander
WC	Watch Commander
DPH	Department of Public Health
JHS	Jail Health Services
PES	Psychiatric Emergency Services at ZSFGH
WIC	Welfare and Institutions Code
ZSFGH	Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital

Custody Operations Division:

Report Number: 170402192
Date: April 3, 2017
Location: County Jail #2

While working in a housing pod during the distribution of dinner, a deputy saw an inmate run out of his assigned housing cell to the upper level of the pod, a restricted area. The deputy ordered the inmate to stop, but he ignored the command. The inmate faced the deputy, took a fighting stance and threw a fist toward the deputy two times. The deputy discharged pepper spray toward the inmate's face. Another deputy placed the inmate on the ground, where he violently resisted while deputies placed him in restraints. The deputies handcuffed and leg-shackled the inmate and housed him in a safety cell.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Report Number: 170402193
Date: April 4, 2017
Location: County Jail #1

The WC requested that a Special Operations Response Team (SORT) assemble because an inmate refused to leave a safety cell. One deputy assigned to SORT carried a Taser. The WC gave the inmate multiple commands to submit to restraints. The WC advised the inmate that if he did not submit to restraints or lay prone on the floor, the deputies would use force. The inmate did not comply. As SORT team members entered the safety cell to secure the inmate, the inmate resisted all attempts to place him in restraints. The deputies gave the inmate multiple orders to cease resisting, or they would use the taser. The deputy carrying the Taser discharged it. The two-taser probes struck the inmate in his upper back. During the five-second Taser cycle, while the inmate was incapacitated, the SORT team attempted to secure the inmate's limbs. The inmate kicked at staff with both legs. Deputies advised the inmate that if he continued resisting they would discharge the Taser again. The inmate did not comply, and the deputies discharged the Taser. During this five-second Taser cycle, SORT team members placed restraints on the inmate. The deputy who discharged the Taser removed two Taser probes from the inmate. JHS treated the inmate and deputized staff transported him to ZSFGH.

Report Number: R041704005
Date: April 6, 2017
Location: County Jail #4

While conducting pill call with JHS, a deputy heard a commotion coming from another housing area two tanks away. Two deputies responded. Upon arriving at the location, they observed two inmates fighting one inmate. One deputy radioed for backup and ordered the inmates several times to stop fighting. None of the three inmates complied. A second deputy discharged pepper spray in the inmates' direction and ordered them to stop fighting. The inmates complied. JHS treated all of the inmates for pepper spray exposure. JHS treated one inmate for a small cut to his nose and lip. Another inmate complained of a burning feeling on his back. JHS evaluated and medically cleared all the inmates for rehousing.

Report Number: 1702000169
Date: April 7, 2017
Location: County Jail #5

A deputy sheriff who was working inside a housing pod at County Jail #5 observed two inmates fighting and radioed for assistance. As he approached the fighting inmates and ordered them to stop. The inmates ignored the deputy's orders and continued fighting. Using a hair-pull takedown, a responding deputy physically separated one inmate from the fight. The other inmate was placed in handcuffs. One inmate had no noticeable injuries, and the other had a small cut under his eye. JHS treated and cleared both inmates who were then rehoused.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Report Number: R041704011A
Date: April 12, 2017
Location: County Jail #4

The WC responded to a radio call for assistance from the front office. When the WC arrived, he observed an inmate on the ground and two deputies attempting to handcuff the inmate. A deputy told the WC that an inmate had attacked another deputy. The WC ordered the inmate to stop resisting, but the inmate refused. The WC used a distraction technique to the side of the inmate's face. The inmate continued to resist. The WC ordered the deputies to handcuff and shackle the inmate. The WC ordered the deputies to place the inmate in a safety cell, but the inmate refused to walk. The WC directed staff to use pain compliance to convince the inmate to walk; it did not work. The deputies eventually carried the inmate to the safety cell. The inmate began resisting again and grabbed a deputy's hand. The WC applied pressure to the inmate's face to persuade the inmate to let go of the deputy's hand. The inmate complied. JHS treated the inmate's face and determined that medical staff at ZSFGH needed to evaluate the inmate.

Report number: 17-02000181
Date: April 20, 2017
Location: County Jail #5

While monitoring the distribution of commissary in a County Jail #5 housing pod, a deputy heard an inmate yelling threats to other inmates. The deputy ordered the inmate several times to stop yelling, but the inmate continued to shout, causing a disturbance in the pod and agitating the other inmates, so the deputy approached to handcuff the inmate. While escorting the inmate to the pod's interview room, the inmate pulled away from the deputy. To maintain control of him, the deputy took the inmate to the ground, asked him to calm down, and explained that he would not tolerate the inmate's behavior. The deputy placed the inmate in the interview room without further incident. While placing the inmate in the interview room, the deputy noticed a small laceration on the inmate's wrist. JHS evaluated the inmate's injury and medically cleared the inmate to be housed.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Report Number: 170402217
Date: April 23, 2017
Location: County Jail #2

A deputy who was working in housing Pod F at County Jail #2 observed an inmate yelling and demanding that JHS see him. The deputy explained the process to be seen by medical to the inmate, but that did not change his continuous disruptive behavior. The deputy repeatedly ordered the inmate to go upstairs to the holding cell. While attempting to escort the inmate upstairs, the inmate reached over behind the deputy's neck. The deputy slipped under the inmate's hold and brought the inmate to the ground. The inmate resisted the deputy's attempts to handcuff him. With the assistance of another deputy, the inmate was restrained with handcuffs and leg shackles. The deputy noticed a cut on the inmate's forehead. JHS treated and cleared deputies to place the inmate in a safety cell.

Report Number: 17-1-04018
Date: April 30, 2017
Location: County Jail #1

While working as the movement deputy at County Jail #1, a deputy heard a medical buzzer sound from a holding cell that contained several inmates. One inmate was repeatedly pushing the buzzer to get a deputy's attention. The deputy responded, and once he determined that there were no medical emergencies occurring in the holding cell, he ordered the inmate to stop. The inmate ignored the deputy's orders and challenged him to make him stop. The deputy decided to move the inmate to a different holding cell to prevent him from continuing to agitate the other inmates in the cell. When the deputy attempted to handcuff the inmate, he pulled away from the deputy and bumped into the Plexiglas wall. After the deputy had finished handcuffing the inmate, he noticed a laceration over one of the inmate's eyes. JHS evaluated the inmate and determined he needed to be transferred for treatment at ZSFGH.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Report Number: 17010501
Date: May 1, 2017
Location: County Jail #1

A deputy, while working as the movement and search deputy, escorted an inmate to the ID processing station to be fingerprinted. During the fingerprinting process, the inmate became agitated and hostile with the fingerprint technician, speaking incoherently and aggressively. The deputy determined that the technician would need to fingerprint the inmate later because of this hostile behavior. While escorting the inmate from the ID Processing area, the inmate began to pull away. The deputy ordered him to stop, but the inmate disobeyed his orders and started yelling while attempting to pull away from the deputy. To gain control of the inmate, the deputy pinned him against a holding cell wall until additional deputies arrived. While resisting the deputies, the inmate bumped his head against a plastic housing cardholder affixed to the outside of the holding cell and breaking it into small pieces. After the deputies had rehoused the inmate, they noticed a small amount of blood on the inmate's eyebrow. JHS examined the inmate, cleaned the wound, and determined that no additional treatment was necessary.

Report Number: R172000204
Date: May 4, 2017
Location: County Jail #5

While working as a housing deputy at County Jail #5, a deputy saw two inmates fighting. The deputy used his radio to call for assistance as he responded. He ordered the inmates to stop fighting, but they did not comply. When additional deputies arrived, they separated the inmates, took them to the ground and handcuffed them. JHS examined both inmates. One inmate had small cuts on his upper lip, and the other had superficial scratches/redness and dried blood in his nose. JHS medically cleared the inmates, and they were rehoused.

Report Number: 170302233
Date: May 4, 2017
Location: County Jail #2

Three deputy sheriffs working in a pod at County Jail #2 heard one inmate verbally assault another inmate. One of the deputies then observed the aggressing inmate throw a punch at the other inmate, and the inmates began to fight. Inmates in the area separated the fighting inmates, and one of the deputies initiated a takedown control hold of the inmate who started the fight and placed her in handcuffs. Another deputy ordered the other inmate involved in the altercation to remain seated on the ground, and she complied. The deputies observed a laceration on the instigating inmate's left eye and several lacerations on the assaulted inmate's face. JHS evaluated the inmates and cleared the deputy sheriffs to rehouse them.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Report Number: 1702000208
Date: May 7, 2017
Location: County Jail #5

While working as a housing pod deputy at County Jail #5, a deputy observed two inmates in the common area facing each other in a bladed stance with closed fists. The deputy ordered the inmates to separate from each other, but they refused. The deputy called for assistance on his radio, and the inmates then began fighting. The deputy working in the adjacent pod responded to assist, ordering the inmates to stop fighting. The inmates ignored his orders. The pod deputy warned the inmates he would use pepper spray if they continued to fight. The inmates continued fighting. The pod deputy discharged his pepper spray in the inmates' faces, and they stopped fighting. Deputies handcuffed the inmates and escorted them to separate holding cells in medical where JHS evaluated and cleared the deputies to rehouse the inmates.

Report Number: 1702000236
Date: May 28, 2017
Location: County Jail #5

A deputy who was relieving a housing pod deputy at County Jail #5 noticed two inmates fighting inside a two-person cell. The deputy radioed the facility about the fight and responded to the cell. The deputy ordered the inmates to stop fighting twice, but the inmates ignored him. The deputy ordered the inmates to stop fighting one more time, without result and then discharged his pepper spray. The inmates continued fighting after the deputy pepper-sprayed them. When additional deputies arrived, they entered the cell, separated the inmates and handcuffed them. JHS evaluated and medically cleared the inmates who were subsequently rehoused by the deputies.

Report Number: R041705035
Date: May 29, 2017
Location: County Jail #4

While monitoring dinner service on the County Jail #4 main line, a deputy saw one inmate begin punching another in a 12-person cell. I ordered the inmate to stop, but he continued to punch and then kick the other inmate who was not engaging. As this occurred, the deputy ordered the inmates not involved in the fight to move to the other side of the cell and radioed the facility for backup. When the first backup deputy arrived, he aimed his pepper spray at the assaulting inmate who ceased fighting. When additional deputies arrived, one deputy opened the cell, and they entered it, handcuffed the inmates, and removed them from the cell. JHS evaluated and medically cleared the inmates who were rehoused separately. Upon investigation, it appeared to be a fight over food.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Report Number: 1702000238
Date: May 29, 2017
Location: County Jail #5

The housing pod deputy heard a commotion in a two-person cell while dinner was being served at County Jail #5. When the deputy arrived at the cell, he saw two inmates fighting. The deputy used his radio to alert the facility of the fight. The pod deputy ordered the inmates to stop fighting. When the inmates did not comply, he warned them that he would use pepper spray. Because they continued to fight, the pod deputy discharged his pepper spray, and then the inmates stopped fighting. When additional deputies arrived, the pod deputy unlocked the cell and the deputies handcuffed and escorted the inmates to the pod's interview rooms, where JHS medically evaluated them. One inmate sustained a superficial cut to one of his fingers, and the other sustained abrasions to the back of the head and his face. JHS medically cleared the inmates who were rehoused by the deputies.

Report Number: 1702000239
Date: May 29, 2017
Location: County Jail #5

While working as a housing pod deputy at County Jail #5, the deputy let the inmates out of their cells for free time when two of them began a mutual fight. The pod deputy radioed the facility about the fight and ran toward the inmates. The pod deputy ordered the inmates to stop fighting multiple times, but they did not comply. The pod deputy warned the inmates he would deploy pepper spray if they did not stop fighting. The inmates continued to fight, and the deputy used his pepper spray. The inmates stopped fighting and laid down on the ground. When additional deputies arrived, the inmates were handcuffed and escorted to the pod interview rooms. JHS examined the inmates and medically cleared them. The deputies rehoused them.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Report Number: R170602273
Date: June 1, 2017
Location: County Jail #2

A deputy qualified on the Taser responded to a radio call for assistance in another housing pod. When the deputy arrived, he observed an inmate, in his cell, picking up and placing the metal drawer he had removed from his bunk, on the floor of his cell. (The metal drawer is not allowed to be removed and is very heavy). The sergeant on scene told the inmate three times to leave the drawer on the floor and step behind the toilet partition. The inmate did not comply and sat on the ground next to the drawer. The sergeant instructed one deputy to open the cell, another deputy to retrieve the drawer, the inmate to remain seated on the floor, and the deputy with the Taser to use it if the inmate attempted to get off the floor. When the deputy opened the door, the inmate stood up; the sergeant yelled, "Taser, Taser, Taser!" The deputy with the Taser discharged it for a three-second cycle, striking the inmate in the midsection. The inmate fell to the ground inside the cell, hitting the ground with the left side of his face resulting in a laceration under his left eye. Deputies entered the cell and secured the inmate in handcuffs and leg shackles. Once the inmate was secure, they removed the Taser prongs from the inmate and logged the spent cartridge. Deputies escorted the inmate to C-Pod for treatment. JHS determined that the inmate needed additional treatment at ZSFGH.

Report Number: R041706005
Date: June 9, 2017
Location: County Jail #4

The post deputy and lieutenant were conducting walkthroughs of a dormitory cell while working Post 28 at County Jail #4. The inmates were not ready for the walkthrough, and the deputies ordered the inmates to get off their bunks and stand. The post deputy and lieutenant entered the tank and noticed one inmate sitting on his bed. The lieutenant instructed him to stand. Initially, the inmate complied, but then sat back down. The inmate then began complaining and causing a disturbance in the tank. Due to the continuing disruption and unpredictability of the inmate, he was placed in handcuffs, without incident. While escorting the inmate to an interview room, the inmate began to pull away from the deputy. Once in the interview room, the lieutenant noticed blood around the inmate's wrists and that the handcuffs had irritated an existing scab. The deputies contacted two JHS staff members to evaluate the injury, but the inmate refused medical treatment, stating that neither of the JHS staff members was qualified to treat him because they were not doctors. He was escorted to a holding cell to calm down and fell asleep.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Report Number: R041706008
Date: June 10, 2017
Location: County Jail #4

Deputies working at County Jail #4 noticed that several inmates in one of the 12 person cells were very loud and disruptive. The deputies decided to move the inmates to the multipurpose room. While moving the inmates, the deputies identified the inmate inciting the other inmates' behavior. The inmate began to step away while being handcuffed. To maintain control of the inmate and complete handcuffing the inmate, the deputy applied a bent rear wrist lock. That deputy and another deputy then walked the inmate down the hall. Halfway down the corridor, the inmate tried to pull away from the deputies, turned to face them, and began taunting them. One deputy was still controlling the inmate with a rear wrist lock and applied pressure to maintain control. The inmate deliberately went limp and fell to the floor. After collapsing, the inmate shouted, "I know something's broken. Lawsuit. I'm suing you all." The deputies then stood the inmate up and placed him in an interview room. As the deputy began to exit the interview room, he lost control of the inmate. A sergeant who was assisting the deputies took control of the inmate, placed him in the interview room, and instructed the other deputy to put the inmate in shackles. The inmate continued taunting the deputies. JHS evaluated and treated the inmate for a small cut on his wrist and medically cleared him. The inmate was then rehoused.

Report Number: 170602291
Date: June 10, 2017
Location: County Jail #2

A kitchen deputy who was picking up laundry from F-Pod, lower level dormitory, heard his colleagues giving instruction to an inmate and responded to assist. The deputies were ordering an inmate to roll up and move his belongings upstairs for being disruptive. The inmate continually refused, yelled profanities and assaulted one of the deputies by throwing his mattress at him. The kitchen deputy ordered the inmate several times to turn around for handcuffing, but the inmate did not comply. Attempting to cuff the inmate, the deputy grabbed the inmate's arm, but the inmate pulled away and took a fighting stance with his fists up. The kitchen deputy and one of the pod deputies then were able to prone the inmate on the ground. Other deputies were summoned, and all other inmates were instructed to return to their bunks. One inmate ignored the deputy's instructions and began walking toward the inmate on the ground, asking him, "You good, bro? You good?" When additional deputies arrived, the deputies handcuffed the approaching inmate and placed him in a holding cell. The inmate on the ground continued to struggle and kick while he ignored the instructions of the deputies to be cuffed. Eventually, the deputies were able to place handcuffs and shackles on the inmate. He was lifted up and carried to a safety cell. Some blood was noticed on the ground, and there was blood on his face, but he refused to be seen by JHS.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Report Number: 17-1-06004
Date: June 10, 2017
Location: County Jail #1

While escorting an inmate at County Jail #1 to the dress-in station, the deputy handed her a plastic property bag. The inmate removed all of her clothes and placed them into the bag, except her socks. The deputy informed the inmate that to complete the dress-in processes, she needed to remove her socks, too. The inmate became agitated and began screaming. The deputy advised the inmate three times that she would need to remove her socks to complete the process. After the inmate had refused a third time, the deputy radioed for a supervisor. The inmate then shouted obscenities at the deputy and grabbed the bag in an attempt to re-dress herself. As the inmate tried to get dressed in her clothes, the deputy removed the bag from her hands. As the deputy removed the bag, the inmate cocked her arm back and took a fighting stance. The deputy struck the inmate in the face with a distraction blow before the inmate had an opportunity to hit her, and immediately placed the inmate into a control hold. The inmate attempted to pull away from and push the deputy. The deputy then used a hair-pull takedown to place the inmate on the ground, where deputies handcuffed her. The inmate kicked at the deputies, and they applied a figure-four control hold until the deputies could put her in leg shackles. After the inmate was under control, the deputies placed her into a safety cell where JHS medically cleared her for a small cut on her right elbow.

Report Number: R041706013
Date: June 16, 2017
Location: County Jail #4

A deputy witnessed two inmates fighting in County Jail #4. The deputy ordered the inmates to stop fighting several times, but they did not comply. The deputy then discharged pepper spray to break up the fight, but it was ineffective. The inmates continued to fight until additional deputies arrived, unlocked the cell door and handcuffed the inmates. JHS evaluated and medically cleared the inmates. Both were subsequently separately housed.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Report Number: R17106019
Date: June 23, 2017
Location: County Jail #1

A deputy responded to a holding cell in County Jail #1 because an inmate pressed the medical emergency button. The deputy asked the inmate if he needed medical attention, and the inmate yelled, "Let me out of jail now!" The deputy told the inmate not to push the button unless he had a medical emergency. The inmate pressed the button again. When the deputy returned to the cell, the inmate was mumbling incoherently. The deputy opened the cell and asked the inmate what his emergency was, and the inmate gave the deputy a hard stare and stated, "I want to hurt myself!" Due to the inmate's unpredictable demeanor, the deputy told the inmate to stand so he could handcuff him, but the inmate refused. An additional deputy arrived, and the deputy gave the inmate one more opportunity to submit to handcuffing. He did not comply. The deputies then entered the cell and used control holds to gain control of the inmate. The inmate resisted the deputies, and they took him to the ground, where they secured him in handcuffs. When the deputies moved the inmate, they noticed blood on the ground. JHS arrived to evaluate the inmate and directed he be transported to ZSFGH for further evaluation.

Report Number: R041706018
Date: June 23, 2017
Location: County Jail #4

An inmate told a deputy who was working on the County Jail #4 mainline "I want to kill myself." The deputy notified his supervisor about the inmate's statement. When his supervisor arrived, they handcuffed and removed the inmate from his cell to rehouse him in a safety cell. While being escorted, the inmate began clenching his hands into fists and resisting the deputies. The deputies ordered the inmate to stop resisting, but he did not comply. One of the deputies applied a bent-wrist control hold to gain compliance from the inmate. Once they arrived at the safety cell, the inmate complied with the deputies' instructions and they exited the cell without incident. Shortly after the deputies placed him in the safety cell, JHS checked on him, and he reported that his right middle finger was injured. JHS noted it and told him he would be seen when released from the safety cell.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Report Number: R17106021
Date: June 23, 2017
Location: County Jail #1

While working as the WC at County Jail #1, a sergeant observed two San Francisco police officers conducting a pat search of a custody they had brought to the county jail. During their pat search, the custody turned around on them, and the officers attempted to take the suspect to the ground. Witnessing the officers struggling to restrain their custody, four sheriff's deputies came to assist them. The deputies and police officers were able to gain control of the suspect, handcuff him and place him in leg shackles. A deputy noticed a cut on the bridge of the custody's nose. The deputy asked JHS to evaluate the inmate. JHS evaluated and refused to accept custody of the suspect from the police officers and informed them that the custody needed further evaluation at ZSFGH before the Sheriff's Department could take custody.

Report Number: R170602321
Date: June 30, 2017
Location: County Jail #2

A sergeant working as the WC at County Jail #2 received a call about an uncooperative inmate during a classification interview. An hour later, the WC received another call from a deputy working in the classification pod informing him that the same inmate was refusing to comply with direct orders from deputized staff. When the WC arrived, he ordered the inmate to stand for transport to County Jail #4. The inmate refused. The WC ordered the inmate again to stand so the deputies could move him to County Jail #4, and he responded by saying, "You try and take me upstairs, we'll see what's gonna happen!" Believing that the inmate might attack deputized staff, the WC placed the inmate in a bent wrist control hold and told him to stand up. The inmate attempted to break free from the control hold but was unsuccessful. Another deputy gained control of the inmate's other hand, and the inmate began yelling and violently pulling away from the deputies. The deputies placed the inmate on the ground, where another deputy applied a figure-four control hold to the inmate's legs. The inmate continued screaming obscenities at the deputies. The WC and the deputies continued to ask the inmate to stop resisting and cooperate. The deputies were finally able to handcuff the inmate, who was still shouting obscenities and violently resisting them. The WC asked again and again for cooperation and the inmate finally agreed. The deputies lifted him up, and he cooperated in walking to a holding cell. The deputies asked JHS to assess the inmate medically. JHS examined the inmate who was uncooperative, but he allowed JHS placed a bandage on a small scratch on the inmate's wrist. The inmate was then transported to County Jail #4 without further incident.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

Field Operations Division:

Report Number: 170-274-638
Date: April 3, 2017
Location: Zuckerberg San Francisco General Hospital (ZSFGH)

The Sheriff's Operations Center dispatched deputies to Ward 7B to respond to a fight involving patients and staff. Upon arriving at the ward, the nurse, who witnessed a patient physically attack another patient, asked the deputies to help place the assaultive patient in a seclusion room. The deputies informed the patient that he needed to stand up and go to the seclusion room. As one deputy approached the patient to assist him to his feet, the patient swung his arm, attempting to strike the deputy. Two deputies took control of the patient's arms and placed him in handcuffs. He continued to resist while the deputies placed him in the seclusion room and after the deputies put him on the bed. The patient attempted to kick his legs toward the deputies. The deputies then put him in a figure-four leg lock. One deputy noticed that the patient was bleeding from the webbing between his fingers. The deputy notified medical staff. A nurse responded, evaluated and treated the wound. A deputy removed the handcuffs. Medical staff secured the patient to the bed without further incident.

Report Number: 170-510-761
Date: June 23, 2017
Location: Potrero Avenue and 23rd Street

While working at the Sheriff's Department's Patrol Unit, deputies received a call for assistance from another deputy. A patient with a medical hold was running out of the emergency department toward 23rd Street, naked. Deputies began responding on foot to reports of the naked man. When the deputies caught up to the suspect, he was standing on the side step of a commercial truck. The driver had stopped the vehicle and deputies attempted to talk the man down from the side of the truck, but he ignored their commands. A deputy carrying his department Taser had unholstered it. Two deputies attempted to remove the man from the truck physically but were unsuccessful. The deputies again gave commands to the man, ordering him to come down from the truck but he continued to ignore them. The man was speaking unintelligibly. The deputies tried to remove the man from the vehicle physically again without success. After exhausting all attempts to remove the man through verbal commands and with physical force, and warning of a Taser shot, the deputies discharged the Taser, but it was ineffective. One deputy grabbed the man's leg and was able to take him to the ground where the deputies handcuffed him. Shortly after the patient was in handcuffs, an ambulance arrived to transport the man back to ZSFGH, where medical staff evaluated him.

96A.3(a)(2)

TOTAL DEPARTMENT ENCOUNTERS

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Total Department (46)		Admin/Programs (0)		Custody/Off Duty (2)		Field Operations (44)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	4	09%	0	-%	0	-%	4	09%
	Black	17	37%	0	-%	1	50%	16	36%
	Hispanic	6	13%	0	-%	0	-%	6	14%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	13	28%	0	-%	1	50%	12	27%
	Unknown	6	13%	0	-%	0	-%	6	14%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	12	26%	0	-%	0	-%	12	27%
	30 – 39	13	28%	0	-%	1	50%	12	27%
	40 – 49	8	17%	0	-%	1	50%	7	16%
	50+	12	26%	0	-%	0	-%	12	27%
	Unknown	1	02%	0	-%	0	-%	1	02%
GENDER	Male	36	78%	0	-%	2	100%	34	77%
	Female	10	22%	0	%	0	-%	10	23%

The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(a)(2) & 96A.3(a)(7)

TOTAL DEPARTMENT ENCOUNTERS RESULTING IN A DETENTION
BY RACE, AGE & GENDER
 April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Total Department (36)		Admin/Programs (0)		Custody (1)		Field Operations (35)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	4	11%	0	-%	0	-%	4	11%
	Black	13	36%	0	-%	1	100%	12	34%
	Hispanic	3	08%	0	-%	0	-%	3	09%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	11	31%	0	-%	0	-%	11	31%
	Unknown	5	14%	0	-%	0	-%	5	14%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	7	19%	0	-%	0	-%	7	20%
	30 – 39	11	31%	0	-%	0	-%	11	31%
	40 – 49	7	19%	0	-%	1	100%	6	17%
	50+	10	28%	0	-%	0	-%	10	29%
	Unknown	1	03%	0	-%	0	-%	1	03%
GENDER	Male	29	81%	0	-%	1	100%	28	80%
	Female	7	19%	0	-%	0	-%	7	20%

The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.

96A.3(a)(2) & 96A.3(a)(7)

TOTAL DEPARTMENT ENCOUNTERS RESULTING IN A TRAFFIC STOP

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Total Department (6)		Admin/Programs (0)		Custody (0)		Field Operations (6)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	Black	2	33%	0	-%	0	-%	2	33%
	Hispanic	3	50%	0	-%	0	-%	3	50%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	Unknown	1	17%	0	-%	0	-%	1	17%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	5	83%	0	-%	0	-%	5	83%
	30 – 39	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	40 – 49	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	50+	1	17%	0	-%	0	-%	1	17%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	5	83%	0	-%	0	-%	5	83%
	Female	1	17%	0	-%	0	-%	1	17%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.									

96A.3(a)(3)

TOTAL SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY DEPUTY SHERIFFS DURING ENCOUNTERS

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Total Department (22)		Admin/Programs (0)		Custody (0)		Field Operations (22)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	4	18%	0	-%	0	-%	4	18%
	Black	8	36%	0	-%	0	-%	8	36%
	Hispanic	2	09%	0	-%	0	-%	2	09%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	4	18%	0	-%	0	-%	4	18%
	Unknown	4	18%	0	-%	0	-%	4	18%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	3	14%	0	-%	0	-%	3	14%
	30 – 39	9	41%	0	-%	0	-%	9	41%
	40 – 49	4	18%	0	-%	0	-%	4	18%
	50+	6	27%	0	-%	0	-%	6	27%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	19	86%	0	-%	0	-%	19	86%
	Female	3	14%	0	-%	0	-%	3	14%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.									

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(a)(5) & 96A.3(a)(7)

TYPES OF SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY DEPUTY SHERIFFS DURING DETENTIONS
BY RACE, AGE & GENDER
 April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Cursory/Pat/Weapons (21)		Vehicle search (1)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	4	19%	0	-%
	Black	8	38%	0	-%
	Hispanic	1	5%	1	100%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%
	White	4	19%	0	-%
	Unknown	4	19%	0	-%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	3	14%	0	-%
	30 – 39	8	38%	1	100%
	40 – 49	4	19%	0	-%
	50+	6	29%	0	-%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	18	86%	1	100%
	Female	3	14%	0	-%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.					

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(a)(6)

TOTAL DISPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM DEPUTY SHERIFF ENCOUNTERS

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Abated (02)		Arrests (07)		Citations (20)		Detentions (08)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	-%	1	14%	1	5%	2	25%
	Black	2	100%	3	43%	8	40%		-%
	Hispanic	0	-%	0	-%	5	25%	1	13%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	0	-%	2	28%	4	20%	3	38%
	Unknown	0	-%	1	14%	2	10%	2	25%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	0	-%	0	-%	8	40%	3	38%
	30 – 39	0	-%	4	57%	4	20%	1	13%
	40 – 49	1	50%	1	14%	3	15%	2	25%
	50+	1	50%	2	28%	5	25%	2	25%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	1	50%	6	86%	17	85%	6	75%
	Female	1	50%	1	14%	3	15%	2	25%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.									

96A.3(a)(6)

TOTAL DISPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM DEPUTY SHERIFF ENCOUNTERS (Continued)

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Medical call (01)		Report made (02)		5150 WI (06)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	Black	1	100%	0	-%	3	50%
	Hispanic	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	0	-%	2	100%	2	33%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%	1	17%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	0	-%	0	-%	1	17%
	30 – 39	0	-%	2	100%	2	33%
	40 – 49	1	100%	0	-%	0	-%
	50+	0	-%	0	-%	2	33%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%	1	17%
GENDER	Male	1	100%	1	50%	4	66%
	Female	0	-%	1	50%	2	33%

The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(a)(6) & 96A.3(a)(7)
DISPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM DEPUTY SHERIFF DETENTIONS
BY RACE, AGE & GENDER
April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Arrests (07)		Citations (14)		Detentions (08)		Medical call (01)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	1	14%	1	7%	2	25%	0	-%
	Black	3	43%	6	43%		-%	1	100%
	Hispanic	0	-%	2	14%	1	13%	0	-%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	2	28%	4	29%	3	38%	0	-%
	Unknown	1	14%	1	7%	2	25%	0	-%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	0	-%	3	21%	3	38%	0	-%
	30 – 39	4	57%	4	29%	1	13%	0	-%
	40 – 49	1	14%	3	21%	2	25%	1	100%
	50+	2	28%	4	29%	2	25%	0	-%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	6	86%	12	86%	6	75%	0	-%
	Female	1	14%	2	14%	2	25%	1	100%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.									

96A.3(a)(6) & 96A.3(a)(7)

DISPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM DEPUTY SHERIFF DETENTIONS (Continued)
BY RACE, AGE & GENDER
 April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		5150 WI (06)	
		Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	-%
	Black	3	50%
	Hispanic	0	-%
	Other	0	-%
	White	2	33%
	Unknown	1	17%
AGE	>18	0	-%
	18 – 29	1	17%
	30 – 39	2	33%
	40 – 49	0	-%
	50+	2	33%
	Unknown	1	17%
GENDER	Male	4	66%
	Female	2	33%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.			

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(a)(6) & 96A.3(a)(7)

DISPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM DEPUTY SHERIFF INITIATED TRAFFIC STOPS
BY RACE, AGE & GENDER
 April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Citations (6)	
		Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	-%
	Black	2	33%
	Hispanic	3	50%
	Other	0	-%
	White	0	-%
	Unknown	1	17%
AGE	>18	0	-%
	18 – 29	5	83%
	30 – 39	0	-%
	40 – 49	0	-%
	50+	1	17%
	Unknown	0	-%
GENDER	Male	5	83%
	Female	1	17%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.			

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(b)(3)

USES OF FORCE

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Total Department (37)		Admin/Programs (0)		Custody (35)		Field Operations (02)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	1	3%	0	-%	0	-%	1	50%
	Black	24	65%	0	-%	23	66%	1	50%
	Hispanic	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	10	27%	0	-%	10	29%	0	-%
	Unknown	2	6%	0	-%	2	6%	0	-%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	20	54%	0	-%	19	54%	1	50%
	30 – 39	10	27%	0	-%	9	26%	1	50%
	40 – 49	4	11%	0	-%	4	11%	0	-%
	50+	3	8%	0	-%	3	9%	0	-%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	35	95%	0	-%	33	94%	2	100%
	Female	2	5%	0	-%	2	6%	0	-%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.									

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(c)(2)

ARRESTS

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Total Department (135)		Admin/Programs (5)		Custody (25)		Field Operations (105)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	10	7%	0	-%	2	08%	8	08%
	Black	61	45%	0	-%	11	44%	50	48%
	Hispanic	15	11%	0	-%	2	8%	13	12%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	45	33%	4	80%	9	36%	32	30%
	Unknown	4	03%	1	20%	1	4%	2	02%
AGE	>18	1	01%	0	-%	0	-%	1	01%
	18 – 29	29	21%	2	40%	7	28%	20	19%
	30 – 39	43	32%	1	20%	9	36%	33	31%
	40 – 49	37	27%	2	40%	8	32%	27	26%
	50+	25	19%	0	-%	1	04%	24	23%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	112	83%	5	100%	19	76%	88	84%
	Female	23	17%	0	-%	6	24%	17	16%

The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(d)

TOTAL BASIS FOR INITIATING AN ENCOUNTER

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Consensual encounter (09)		Mental health evaluation (05)		Probable cause (22)		Reasonable suspicion (04)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	-%	0	-%	3	14%	1	25%
	Black	6	67%	3	60%	7	32%	0	-%
	Hispanic	0	-%	0	-%	3	14%	0	-%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	2	22%	2	40%	8	36%	1	25%
	Unknown	1	11%	0	-%	1	05%	2	50%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	1	11%	0	-%	4	18%	3	75%
	30 – 39	3	33%	2	40%	7	32%	0	-%
	40 – 49	3	33%	0	-%	4	18%	1	25%
	50+	2	22%	2	40%	7	32%	0	-%
	Unknown	0	-%	1	10%	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	8	89%	3	60%	16	73%	4	100%
	Female	1	11%	2	40%	6	27%	0	-%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.									

96A.3(d)

TOTAL BASIS FOR INITIATING AN ENCOUNTER (Continued)
BY RACE, AGE & GENDER
 April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Facility security checkpoint violation (1)		Traffic violation (5)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	-%	0	-%
	Black	0	-%	1	20%
	Hispanic	0	-%	3	60%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%
	White	0	-%	0	-%
	Unknown	1	100%	1	20%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	0	-%	4	80%
	30 – 39	1	100%	0	-%
	40 – 49	0	-%	0	-%
	50+	0	-%	1	20%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	1	100%	4	80%
	Female	0	-%	1	20%

The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.

96A.3(d)

BASIS FOR INITIATING AN ENCOUNTER RESULTING IN A DETENTION

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Consensual encounter (7)		Mental health evaluation (5)		Probable cause (19)		Reasonable suspicion (4)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	-%	0	-%	3	16%	1	25%
	Black	4	57%	3	60%	6	32%	0	-%
	Hispanic	0	-%	0	-%	3	16%	0	-%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	2	29%	2	40%	6	32%	1	25%
	Unknown	1	14%	0	-%	1	05%	2	50%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	1	14%	0	-%	3	16%	3	75%
	30 – 39	3	43%	2	40%	5	26%	0	-%
	40 – 49	2	29%	0	-%	4	21%	1	25%
	50+	1	14%	2	40%	7	37%	0	-%
	Unknown	0	-%	1	10%	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	7	100%	3	60%	14	74%	4	100%
	Female	0	-%	2	40%	5	26%	0	-%

The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(d)

BASIS FOR INITIATING AN ENCOUNTER RESULTING IN A DETENTION (Continued)

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Facility security checkpoint violation (1)	
		Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	-%
	Black	0	-%
	Hispanic	0	-%
	Other	0	-%
	White	0	-%
	Unknown	1	100%
AGE	>18	0	-%
	18 – 29	0	-%
	30 – 39	1	100%
	40 – 49	0	-%
	50+	0	-%
	Unknown	0	-%
GENDER	Male	1	100%
	Female	0	-%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.			

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(d)

BASIS FOR INITIATING AN ENCOUNTER RESULTING IN A TRAFFIC STOP

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Traffic violation (5)		Probable cause (1)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	-%	0	-S%
	Black	1	20%	1	100%
	Hispanic	3	60%	0	-%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%
	White	0	-%	0	-%
	Unknown	1	20%	0	-%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	4	80%	1	100%
	30 – 39	0	-%	0	-%
	40 – 49	0	-%	0	-%
	50+	1	20%	0	-%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	4	80%	1	100%
	Female	1	20%	0	-%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.					

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(d)

BASIS FOR INITIATING AN ARREST (Continued)

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Probable cause (25)		Release in error (3)		Remanded into custody (1)		Facility security checkpoint violation (1)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	1	4%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	Black	12	48%	1	33%	0	-%	0	-%
	Hispanic	3	12%	1	33%	0	-%	0	-%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	8	32%	0	-%	1	100%	1	100%
	Unknown	1	4%	1	33%	0	-%	0	-%
AGE	>18	1	4%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	1	4%	1	33%	0	-%	0	-%
	30 – 39	13	52%	2	66%	0	-%	1	100%
	40 – 49	4	16%	0	-%	1	100%	0	-%
	50+	6	24%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	21	84%	3	100%	1	100%	1	100%
	Female	4	16%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%

The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.

San Francisco Sheriff's Department
 Use of Force Report – Second Quarter of 2017

96A.3(d)

BASIS FOR INITIATING AN ARREST

BY RACE, AGE & GENDER

April 1, 2017 – June 30, 2017

		Consensual encounter (3)		Crime by prisoner (5)		Outstanding arrest warrant (95)		Private persons arrest (2)	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
RACE	Asian/Pacific Islander	0	-%	0	-%	9	-9%	0	-%
	Black	2	66%	4	80%	42	44%	0	-%
	Hispanic	0	-%	0	-%	10	11%	1	50%
	Other	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	White	1	33%	1	20%	32	34%	1	50%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%	2	2%	0	-%
AGE	>18	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
	18 – 29	0	-%	2	40%	25	26%	0	-%
	30 – 39	1	33%	1	20%	25	26%	0	-%
	40 – 49	1	33%	2	40%	28	30%	1	50%
	50+	1	33%	0	-%	17	18%	1	50%
	Unknown	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%	0	-%
GENDER	Male	3	100%	5	100%	77	81%	1	50%
	Female	0	-%	0	-%	18	19%	1	50%
The department rounded percentages to the nearest whole number.									

ATTACHMENT C

**SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT
FORCE REVIEW BOARD**

INCIDENT INFORMATION	
GO:	2017-301635
Date of Incident:	08/15/2017
Involved Officers/Level of Force:	Ofc. A
Overall Incident Level of Force:	Type II
INVESTIGATION INFORMATION	
Investigating Supervisor:	Sgt. X
Unit: <i>[FIT, SWAT, Precinct]</i>	East
Date Chain of Command Review Complete:	09/08/2017
BOARD INFORMATION	
Date of Board:	09/19/2017
Board Chair:	
PRESENTATION OF INVESTIGATION	
FRB Case Presenter:	

Incident Summary:

Officers from East and West responded to a suicidal male on the I-5 overpass at Madison Street. SPD dispatch advised the officers that the subject had a bed sheet tied to the bridge with the other end fashioned into a noose. Officers arrived and began a dialogue with the subject, attempting to talk him away from the railing.

Officers requested additional resources including: WSP for traffic control (due to the heavy freeway traffic) and the Crisis Response Team (CRT). Prior to WSP arriving on scene, and without warning, the subject slid the noose around his neck and began climbing over the railing. Officer A deployed his Taser at the subject in an attempt to stop the subject from successfully climbing over the railing to kill himself and to stop him from injuring someone on the freeway as WSP has not yet arrived on scene to shut down traffic on the freeway below. The Taser deployment was unsuccessful and the subject threw himself over the railing. As the subject was hanging from the noose, officers were able to pull him back up and over the railing, saving his life. SFD responded to the scene to treat the subject, where he was subsequently transported to HMC.

A. TACTICS AND DECISION MAKING	
<p>1. Did the officer(s) employ tactics and decision making consistent with:</p> <p>a. Policy? If NO, which non-force policies? (include ICV here) (if Use of Force Policy, discuss in next section) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>b. Training? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No If NO, what training?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Deferred to pending OPA Investigation</p>	<p>Check all that apply for each officer/issue:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No Further Action Needed.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> PAS entry. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to chain of command for counsel. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to training. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA. Specific policy violations referred:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to other _____. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p>Board Analysis & Conclusions:</p> <p><i>The Board concluded that the involved officers' actions were consistent with department policy and training. Additional officers were called for assistance due to the subject refusing to comply to officers' commands. Officers spoke calmly to the subject, to no avail. Once the subject turned and</i></p>
<p>2. De-escalation:</p> <p>Did the officer(s) involved take reasonable efforts to de-escalate prior to using force? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Not feasible:</p> <p><u>Describe:</u> <i>No additional de-escalation tactics were identified by the Board that the involved officers could have used. Officers communicated with the subject in an attempt to get him to comply to their commands. The subject would not engage with the officers and attempted to commit suicide. CRT was on-scene in addition to the patrol officers.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decreasing exposure through time, distance, cover, or concealment • Containment of threat or placement of barriers • Verbal persuasion and/or advisements • Listen and Explain with Equity and Dignity (LEED) • Calling resources (CIT, additional officers, less lethal officers) • Other tactics to achieve compliance: 	

<input type="checkbox"/> Deferred to pending OPA Investigation	<p><i>moved towards the railing, de-escalation was no longer feasible and officers had to act immediately to prevent injury to the motorists below.</i></p>
---	---

<p><u>REVIEW OF TACTICS AND DECISION MAKING:</u> <i>List By Each Involved Officer</i></p>	
<p><u>Administrative Approval:</u> Based on the documentation provided, the tactics and decision-making employed appear to be consistent with policy, and training.</p>	
<p><u>Administrative Disapproval:</u> Based on the documentation provided, the tactics and decision-making employed do not appear to be consistent with policy and training. See above for analysis details.</p>	
<p>Name and Serial Number</p>	<p>Approved / Disapproved / Deferred to OPA</p>
<p>1. Ofc. A</p>	<p>Approved</p>

B. COMPLIANCE WITH SPD USE OF FORCE POLICY	
<p>3. Compliance with the SPD Use of Force policy:</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">a. Was the force used Reasonable, Necessary, and Proportional? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">b. Did the force conform to all policy requirements? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>Board Analysis & Conclusions (each involved employee): <i>Officer A deployed his Taser in an attempt to prevent the subject from jumping over the freeway overpass and to protect the motorists under the overpass, since the freeway had not yet been shut down by WSP. The Taser application was not successful because the subject's clothing interfered with Taser probe connection.</i></p> <p><i>No OPA referrals were made or requested.</i></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Deferred to pending OPA Investigation</p>	<p>If "No", then:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA.</p> <p>Specific policy violations referred:</p>

<p>4. Do any of the Use of Force reports need to be re-classified? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>If yes, what reclassifications are needed, and why:</p>	<p>If "YES", then:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Re-classify as Type ____.</p>
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<p>REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE: <i>List by Each Involved Officer</i></p>					
<p><u>Administrative Approval:</u> Based on the documentation provided, the force used was compliant with SPD Use of Force policy.</p>					
<p><u>Administrative Disapproval:</u> Based on the documentation provided, the force used was not compliant with SPD Use of Force policy. See above for analysis details.</p>					
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: left; padding: 2px;">Name and Serial Number</th> <th style="text-align: left; padding: 2px;">Approved / Disapproved / Deferred to OPA</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">1. Ofc. A</td> <td style="padding: 2px;">Approved</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Name and Serial Number	Approved / Disapproved / Deferred to OPA	1. Ofc. A	Approved	
Name and Serial Number	Approved / Disapproved / Deferred to OPA				
1. Ofc. A	Approved				

C. SUPERVISION

5. Was a SPD supervisor(s) on-scene prior to the Force being applied? Yes No

If yes, did the on-scene supervisor(s) provide appropriate tactical guidance and support during the Force incident? Yes No N/A

If no, and a supervisor responded to the scene afterwards, were there any identified issues with the on-scene portion of the Use of Force Investigation?

Yes No N/A

Board analysis:

Sgt. Y (West Pct) and Sgt. Z (East Pct) were on scene during the time of the incident. However, due to the lack of control and guidance, there was no coordination among the officers on scene. Officer were not delegated their tactical roles such as: less lethal, contact, or cover. The lack of coordinated control resulted in responding officers from different precincts not formulating a plan of action.

Because an East Precinct officer used reportable force, the UOF investigation was assumed by the East Precinct. It was also unclear to the Board why Sgt. Z requested Sgt. X to respond to the scene for the Use of Force Investigation since he was already on-scene.

The East Precinct Commander debriefed this incident with both precincts. No further action is needed.

Deferred to pending OPA Investigation

Check all that apply for each supervisor:

No Further Action.

PAS entry.

Action requested by FRB:

Refer to chain of command for counsel.

Action requested by FRB:

Refer to training.

Action requested by FRB:

Refer to OPA.

Specific policy violations referred:

Refer to _____.

Action requested by FRB:

REVIEW OF INCIDENT SUPERVISION—List by Each Involved Supervisor							
<p>Administrative Approval: The review board finds that the supervision and direction of the incident appears to be consistent with policy and training.</p>							
<p>Administrative Disapproval: The review board finds that the supervision and direction of the incident does not appear to be consistent with policy or training. See above for analysis details.</p>							
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: left; padding: 2px;">Name and Serial Number</th> <th style="text-align: left; padding: 2px;">Approved / Disapproved / Deferred to OPA</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">1. Sgt. Y</td> <td style="padding: 2px;">Disapproved</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">2. Sgt. Z</td> <td style="padding: 2px;">Disapproved</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Name and Serial Number	Approved / Disapproved / Deferred to OPA	1. Sgt. Y	Disapproved	2. Sgt. Z	Disapproved	
Name and Serial Number	Approved / Disapproved / Deferred to OPA						
1. Sgt. Y	Disapproved						
2. Sgt. Z	Disapproved						
D. REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION							
<p>6a. Was the investigation and review completed within 14-days from the date of the incident?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>8/15/17 to 9/19/17</p> <p>If No, was there an extension approved by a Bureau Chief? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to ____.</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Specific policy violations referred:</p>						
<p>6b. For FIT Cases only:</p> <p>Was the FIT investigation completed within 30-days (90 for an OIS)? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>If no, was there an extension approved by a Bureau Chief? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to ____.</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Specific policy violations referred:</p>						
<p>7. Is the investigation complete (i.e. Do we have all material information need to conduct this review and analysis, or were there problems/issues discovered by the FRB?)?</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>Board Analysis: <i>The investigating chain of command provided all information needed to review this case. The Board noted that A/Lt. W's review did not include an analysis of the force to justify his approval. The Board requested that this information be sent back to the chain as feedback. It was noted the Precinct commander provided a very detailed analysis why the force was approved and within policy.</i></p>	<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Refer to A/C Wilske for East Chain of Command</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Action requested by FRB: <i>Information to A/Lt W to provide an analysis and justification why he is approving the force.</i></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Specific policy violations referred:</p>						


<p>8. Did the Chain of Command identify any deficiencies in training, performance, equipment or policy issues?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sergeant <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A • Admin Lt <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> N/A • Lieutenant <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A • Captain <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A <p>If yes, were such deficiencies properly addressed/referred? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>Describe: <i>The East Precinct commander conducted a debrief on this incident. The Chain also investigated why one supervisor did not have ICV for this incident. Upon contacting IT, it was discovered during routine vehicle maintenance, the ICV system was turned off and not turn back on by mechanics, once the maintenance work was finished. Since the sergeant responded directly from the precinct, he was unaware the ICV and Idelright systems were not functioning properly.</i></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to _____. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA Specific policy violations referred:</p>
<p>9. Did the Force Review Board identify any additional issues not identified by the Chain of Command? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>If yes, describe (including recommendation(s)/action(s) to be taken):</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to _____. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to OPA Specific policy violations referred:</p>

REVIEW OF INCIDENT REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION:

Administrative Approval: The review board finds that the investigation is thorough and complete. The review board finds that preponderance of the evidence supports the reviewer's determinations.

Administrative Disapproval: The review board finds that the investigation is not thorough and complete or the preponderance of evidence supports the reviewer's determinations. See above for analysis details.

E. OTHER BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS	
<p>10. Were there any other issues raised or lessons learned during this incident? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>Describe:</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to APRS. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to Training. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to Chain of Command. Action requested by FRB:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refer to _____. Action requested by FRB:</p>

NOTES/COMMENTS:				
UOFRB Chair	Date	Print Name	Serial	Unit #
	10-24-17	Capt. Woolery	5286	C180
Assistant Chief	Date	Print Name	Serial	Unit #
(Reviewed as to form) 	10/25/17	A/C Cordner	5432	C100

ATTACHMENT D

ABRIDGED SUMMARY OF CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE INCIDENT AND FINDINGS BY THE LOS ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS

OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING – 057-15

Division	Date	Duty-On (X) Off ()	Uniform-Yes (X) No ()
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Wilshire	7/9/15		
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Officer(s) Involved in Use of Force	Length of Service
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Officer A	8 years, 5 months
Officer B	1 year, 3 months

Reason for Police Contact

Officers responded to a call of a Vandalism Subject. Officers contacted the Subject who was uncooperative and fought with them. The Subject grabbed the officer's TASER and used it against him, resulting in an officer-involved shooting (OIS).

Subject	Deceased (X)	Wounded ()	Non-Hit ()
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Subject: Male, 38 years of age

Board of Police Commissioners' Review

This is a brief summary designed only to enumerate salient points regarding this Categorical Use of Force incident and does not reflect the entirety of the extensive investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department (Department) or the deliberations by the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC). In evaluating this matter, the BOPC considered the following: the complete Force Investigation Division investigation (including all of the transcribed statements of witnesses, pertinent subject criminal history, and addenda items); the relevant Training Evaluation and Management System materials of the involved officers; the Use of Force Review Board recommendations; the report and recommendations of the Chief of Police; and the report and recommendations of the Inspector General. The Department Command staff presented the matter to the BOPC and made itself available for any inquiries by the BOPC.

Because state law prohibits divulging the identity of police officers in public reports, for ease of reference, the masculine pronouns (he, his, and him) will be used in this report to refer to male or female employees.

The following incident was adjudicated by the BOPC on June 14, 2016.

Incident Summary

Officers A and B were deployed in a black and white police vehicle equipped with emergency equipment. The officers were assigned a radio call of a Vandalism Subject. The comments of the call indicated that the Subject was a male, breaking windows with a skateboard.

Note: Witness A was in the area and photographed the Subject with his cellular telephone as he broke a window of a business. Witness B was also driving in the same area and with his cellular telephone, captured video of the Subject breaking a window. Both witnesses drove away and neither witnessed the subsequent officer-involved shooting (OIS).

As Officer A drove along the street, he observed that a window from a vacant commercial building had been smashed. As Officers A and B continued along the street, they saw the male who matched the description given in the radio call. The Subject was swinging a skateboard at a store window.

Officer A drove past the Subject and stopped in front of him. According to Officer A, the Subject was using the skateboard to try to break another window. Officer B exited the police vehicle with his pistol unholstered because the Subject had a large bag strapped across his chest and his hands were now concealed inside of it. Officer B could not see what was inside the bag and held his service pistol at a low ready position.

At this point, Officer B estimated the Subject was approximately 15-20 feet away from him as he yelled at him to drop the bag and to get on the ground. The Subject did not reply to the officer's commands. The Subject stared at Officer B and then got back on his skateboard and proceeded away from the officers. Officer A told Officer B to broadcast a backup request.

As the Subject continued southbound riding his skateboard, he would periodically lose his balance and stumble off the skateboard. The officers stopped the police car and monitored the Subject each time he would fall or stumble. The Subject again stumbled off the skateboard, and Officer A believed the Subject was going to continue fleeing from them and was concerned that he may pick up the skateboard and use it as a weapon. Officer A believed they had an opportunity to seize the skateboard, so he told Officer B to go grab it. Officer A stopped the car and Officer B exited and ran to pick up the skateboard.

As Officer B exited the police vehicle and tried to pick up the skateboard, Officer A also exited the police vehicle. Officer A saw that the Subject had turned and was racing toward Officer B and the skateboard. Officer A believed that if the Subject got to the skateboard first, he would attack Officer B with it. Officer A believed that the Subject was charging at Officer B and felt he had to protect his partner.

The Subject got to the skateboard first. Officer B unholstered his service pistol, and held it at a low ready position. As the Subject was bending down to pick up the skateboard, Officer B ordered him to drop it.

Officer A ran at a full sprint to intercept the Subject. Officer A placed his arms around the Subject from behind in a bear hug before he could pick up the skateboard. Officer A's intention was to tackle the Subject so he could not pick up the skateboard or attack Officer B. As Officer A grabbed the Subject, the forward momentum caused them to land on the steps, leading up to a residential property. At this point Officer B holstered his service pistol.

The Subject landed on the steps face-down with his arms under his chest. Officer A could not see the Subject's hands at this time. Officer A transitioned from the bear hug to placing his knee and forearm on the Subject's back.

Officer B was now on Officer A's left side helping him get the Subject's arms out from under his chest. Officer A gave the Subject multiple commands to give him his hands, but the Subject did not comply and remained face-down with his arms under him. Officer B told Officer A that he could not see the Subject's hands and did not know if he was holding anything. Officer A delivered two right elbow strikes to the Subject's middle upper back while maintaining his knee on the Subject's lower back. The Subject had no reaction to Officer A's strikes.

Officer A did not know if the Subject was armed with any weapons. Officer A told Officer B to "Tase" the Subject. Officer B unholstered his TASER and gave the command for the Subject to give up or he would be tased. Officer A told Officer B to conduct a drive-stun. Officer B told the Subject that he was going to be tased if he did not comply. He removed the cartridge and conducted a spark check. Officer B believed that by conducting a five-second spark check, the Subject would "ease up." Officer B said that the Subject had no reaction to the spark check.

Officer B then placed his TASER against the left side of the Subject's stomach and conducted a drive-stun application. The Subject started to buck his upper body. At this time, Officer A remained on top of the Subject's back. Officer A had his knee on the Subject's lower back and his forearm was across the Subject's shoulders. The TASER appeared to have no effect on the Subject as he pushed up and rolled over to now face Officer A in an upward position.

The Subject continued to struggle flailing his arms around. Officer A grabbed the Subject's right arm, and with a closed right fist, punched his center body mass area four to five times while yelling at the Subject to stop moving and to give up. Officer A told Officer B to Tase the Subject again. Officer B conducted a drive-stun on the Subject's stomach area.

Officer A was unable to get any compliance from the Subject. The Subject had been tased twice at this point. Officer A had elbowed him, punched him, and nothing was

having any effect. Officer A broadcast a Help Call because nothing was working to subdue the Subject. Due to the struggle with the Subject, Officer A felt he was fatigued and exhausted.

According to Officer B, he could not holster the TASER because the holster was on his left side and his left side was against the steps. He wanted to holster the TASER so he could maintain control of the Subject's left arm. Officer B then released the Subject's left arm and grabbed his legs so he could not kick Officer A.

Officer B transitioned his legs around the Subject's legs to maintain control of them. He then tried to regain control of the Subject's left arm with his free hand. Officer B believed that his best option was to place the TASER far enough away from the Subject's grasp, but close enough for him to reach it if it became necessary to use it. He placed the TASER on the steps above and behind him.

The Subject rolled over and was again face down and struggling. Officer B believed that the Subject could not reach the TASER and that he would be the only person able to reach it. During the altercation, both Officer B and the Subject were lying across the stairs leading up to the front entrance of the residential property. Their legs were partially on the sidewalk and their torsos were across the first couple of steps.

Officer B had partial control of the Subject's left arm, but the Subject was able to reach up with his right arm and grab for the TASER. Officer B saw the Subject reach for the TASER, but was not quick enough to stop him. Officer B informed Officer A that the Subject now had possession of his TASER.

Officer A ordered the Subject, to give him his arms. Officer A then heard Officer B screaming that he was being tased by the Subject. According to Officer A, he observed Officer B shaking violently and saw Officer B trying to push the Subject away from him. Officer A observed Officer B with his hands up in the air and screaming as he was being tased.

The Subject was lying prone on the stairs partially covering Officer B. Officer A could not see the Subject's hands, but he could hear Officer B screaming and shaking. Officer A also heard the noise of the TASER sparking.

According to Officer A, he unholstered his firearm, believing that the Subject was causing serious bodily injury to his partner. Officer A also could not determine if the Subject was grabbing Officer B's weapon and could not see anything the Subject was doing, but could hear Officer B screaming that he was being tased. Officer A believed that his partner was unable to fight and believed he was on his own to deal with the Subject. Officer A then stood up and with his weapon in a close contact position, placed it towards the Subject's upper back. Officer A again told the Subject to drop it and because his partner continued to scream, Officer A believed that the Subject was going for Officer B's weapon.

Officer A shot the Subject one time on his upper back from close range. Because the Subject was partially on Officer B, Officer A believed that he was offset enough to ensure the round would not strike Officer B.

After the shot, the Subject stopped his attack on Officer B. Officer B stood up and Officer A maintained his service pistol at a low-ready position covering the Subject. A Resuce Ambulance (RA) was immediately requested for the Subject as responding officers arrived and handcuffed the Subject.

Note: The investigation determined that the TASER was activated a total of seven times, ranging in duration from one second to five seconds, during the struggle.

Sergeant A obtained a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from the officers and ensured proper separation and monitoring. Sergeant A also ensured that an RA was requested for the Subject, established a perimeter, assigned officers to canvass, and helped secure the crime scene.

Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) arrived at the scene and provided medical attention to the Subject. The Subject was transported to a local hospital where he succumbed to his injury.

Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners' Findings

The BOPC reviews each Categorical Use of Force incident based upon the totality of the circumstances, namely all of the facts, evidence, statements and all othis pertinent material relating to the particular incident. In every case, the BOPC makes specific findings in three areas: Tactics of the involved officer(s); Drawing/Exhibiting of a firearm by any involved officer(s); and the Use of Force by any involved officer(s). All incidents are evaluated to identify areas where involved officers can benefit from a tactical debriefing to improve their response to future tactical situations. This is an effort to ensure that all officers' benefit from the critical analysis that is applied to each incident as it is reviewed by various levels within the Department and by the BOPC. Based on the BOPC's review of the instant case, the BOPC unanimously made the following findings.

A. Tactics

The BOPC found Officers A and B's tactics to warrant Administrative Disapproval.

B. Drawing/Exhibiting

The BOPC found Officers A and B's drawing and exhibiting of a firearm to be in policy.

C. Non-Lethal Use of Force

The BOPC found Officer A and B's non-lethal use of force to be in policy.

D. Less-Lethal Use of Force

The BOPC found Officer B's less-lethal use of force to be in policy.

E. Lethal Use of Force

The BOPC found Officer A's lethal use of force to be out of policy.

Basis for Findings

A. Tactics

- In its analysis of this incident, the BOPC noted the following tactical considerations:

1. Waiting for Additional Resources

Officers A and B did not wait for additional resources to arrive before making contact with the Subject.

Operational success is based on the ability of the officers to effectively plan and approach each incident in a safe manner, keeping officer safety in mind at all times. Officers, when faced with an ongoing tactical situation, must remain alert to improve their overall safety, by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution.

In this case, Officers A and B responded to a radio call of a Subject that was reported to be breaking windows with a skateboard. Upon their arrival, Officer A observed the Subject holding a skateboard in his hands and swinging it at a window. When the officers exited their vehicle and attempted to make contact with the Subject, he fled on his skateboard. The officers requested back-up, knew there were officers responding to assist them and planned to wait for the arrival of additional officers before making contact with the Subject.

Officer A changed the plan after observing the Subject falling off his skateboard several times and directed Officer B to get out the vehicle and retrieve the skateboard the next time they observed the Subject stumble and get separated from his skateboard. However, Officer B was unable to retrieve the skateboard before the Subject, and a struggle ensued between the officers and the Subject before the back-up officers could arrive to assist.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that Officer A's decision to abandon the tactical plan to wait for additional resources and direct

Officer B, to retrieve the skateboard, that he perceived to be a potential weapon, unnecessarily jeopardized the safety of his partner. This was a substantial deviation, without justification from approved Department tactical training.

2. Maintaining Control of a TASER

Officers, when faced with a tactical incident, improve their overall safety by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution. The ability to adjust to a tactical situation ensures minimal exposure to the officers.

In this instance, Officer B placed his TASER in a location where the Subject was able to grab it with his right hand and subsequently deliver drive stun activations to Officer B's left thigh, causing him to be temporarily paralyzed from the waist down.

The BOPC concluded that Officer B's failure to properly secure his TASER unnecessarily compromised the safety of the officers and was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training.

- The BOPC additionally considered the following:
 1. Spark Test – The investigation revealed that Officer B drew his TASER, removed the cartridge and conducted a spark check while the officers were actively attempting to take the Subject into custody on the steps. Officer B is reminded that when physical contact has been made and an officer is unable to control a Subject, it may be tactically prudent to forgo a spark test.
 2. Optimal Target Areas of the TASER – Officer B conducted a drive stun activation to the Subject's ribcage and lower left back. Officer B is reminded that the optimal target areas in the drive stun mode are the Subject's forearm, outside thigh, or calf muscle.
 3. Required Equipment – The investigation revealed that when Officer A deployed from his vehicle and ran toward the Subject, he did so without his baton. Officer A also did not have a Hobble Restraint Device on his person at the time of the incident. Officer A is reminded to have all required equipment on his person while performing field patrol duties.

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and that the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

The BOPC found that the tactics utilized by Officers A and B substantially and unjustifiably deviated from approved Department tactical training, thus requiring a finding of Administrative Disapproval.

B. Drawing/Exhibiting

- According to Officer B, as he exited the vehicle, he was unable to see the Subject's hands because they were inside of a large bag that was slung across his chest. Officer B drew his service pistol and ordered the Subject to get on the ground. During the struggle to take the Subject into custody, Officer A heard Officer B screaming that he was being tased by the Subject. Unable to see the Subject's hands, Officer A didn't know if the Subject might be reaching for a gun and drew his service weapon.

Based on the totality of the circumstances and supporting evidence, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers A and B, while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

In conclusion, the BOPC found Officers A and B's drawing and exhibiting a firearm to be in policy.

C. Non-Lethal Use of Force

- **Officer A** – Takedown, Bodyweight, Elbow Strikes, Punches and Physical Force
- **Officer B** – Firm Grip, Bodyweight and Physical Force

Officer A observed the Subject running toward Officer B and believed that he was going to attack him. Officer A ran toward the Subject, wrapped both arms around his torso area and forced the Subject to the ground. The Subject landed in a prone position on the sidewalk and steps, with both arms under his chest and Officer A on top of him.

According to Officer A, Officer B assumed a position on the left side of the Subject and grabbed his left arm in an effort to try to assist Officer A with freeing his hand up. Officer A repeatedly ordered the Subject to give him his hands. The Subject did not comply and continued to struggle with the officers. Officer A was unable to see if the Subject had anything in his hands. Officer A placed a knee on the Subject's lower back and delivered two elbow strikes to his right shoulder in an effort to gain control of the Subject's arms.

As Officer B attempted to gain control of the Subject's left arm, the Subject started kicking. Officer B moved down and bear hugged his legs with both arms to minimize his movement. According to Officer B, he then scooted upward until his torso was aligned with the Subject and then wrapped his legs around the Subject's legs to

continue to try to minimize his movement. He then attempted to gain control of the Subject's left arm again, but was unable to do so.

According to Officer B, the Subject displayed no reaction to any of their non-lethal force efforts to stop his resistance and take him into custody. Officer B retrieved his TASER from its holster and applied three to four drive stun activations to the Subject. After the last drive stun, the Subject started to flip over and release his hands. Having gained access to the Subject's left arm, and believing that Officer A had access to his right arm, Officer B placed his TASER down on a step in preparation to handcuff the Subject.

According to Officer A, the Subject began to buck his upper body up in the air after the first drive stun. Officer A maintained a knee on the Subject's lower back and a forearm on his upper back in an attempt to hold the Subject down. The Subject then began turning his body toward Officer A, while swinging his arms. According to Officer A, he punched the Subject four to five times in the chest or stomach area in an attempt to stop him from swinging his arms.

Officer A observed Officer B seated on the steps. Officer B applied a second drive stun activation. The Subject continued to turn over and rolled on top of Officer B. According to Officer A, he was unable to see the Subject's hands and fatigued from his struggle with the Subject, so he applied all of his bodyweight on the Subject in an attempt to hold him down.

After a review of the incident and the non-lethal force used by these officers, the BOPC determined that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers A and B would believe this same application of force would be reasonable to overcome the Subject's resistance, prevent his escape and effect an arrest.

In conclusion, the BOPC found Officers A and B's non-lethal uses of force to be objectively reasonable and in policy.

D. Less-Lethal Use of Force

- **Officer B – TASER**

According to Officer B, the Subject continued to resist and did not show any change in his behavior as the officers continued their efforts to stop his resistance. Officer B administered three to four drive stun activations to the Subject's ribcage and lower back area in an attempt to stop his resistance.

Department policy states that the decision to use force must be judged through the perspective of a reasonable officer under similar circumstances. The BOPC determined, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer B would reasonably believe that the application of less-lethal force to stop the Subject's actions was reasonable and would have acted in a similar manner.

In conclusion, the BOPC found Officers B's less-lethal use of force to be objectively reasonable and in policy.

E. Lethal Use of Force

- **Officer A – (pistol, one round)**

According to Officer A, he was unable to see the Subject's hands and believed that the Subject may be trying to grab Officer B's weapon. Officer A assumed a standing position and ordered the Subject to drop the TASER. Officer A did not observe any reaction from the Subject, but noted Officer B was still shaking profusely and appeared to be completely out of fight. Fearing that the Subject was going for his Officer B's weapon, Officer A fired one round at the Subject to stop the threat.

Based on the totality of the circumstance, the BOPC believed that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer A, while faced with the same or similar circumstances would not reasonably believe the Subject's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury at the time Officer A fired his service pistol at the Subject.

In conclusion, the BOPC found Officer A's use of lethal force to be out of policy.