

**Use of Force  
April 2017 Matrix**

Concept	Findings	Rec #	Recommendations	Priority	Status	Bureau	Executive Sponsor	Findings Manager	Project Manager
Leadership/ Management Culture	<b>The majority of deadly use of force incidents by SFPD involved persons of color.</b>	1.1	SFPD must commit to reviewing and understanding the reasons for the disparate use of deadly force. Specifically, SFPD needs to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partner with a research institution to evaluate the circumstances that give rise to deadly force, particularly those involving persons of color.</li> <li>• Develop and enhance relationships in those communities most impacted by deadly officer involved shootings and monitor trends in calls for service and community complaints to ensure appropriate police interaction occurs as a matter of routine police engagement.</li> <li>• Provide ongoing training for officers throughout the Department on how to assess and engage in encounters involving conflict with a potential for use of force with a goal of minimizing the level of force needed to successfully and safely resolve such incidents.</li> </ul>	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Lt. Braconi	Sgt. Nicole Jones
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD has closed only one deadly use of force incident investigation for the time frame 2013 to 2015.</b> The SFPD has been involved in nine deadly use of force incidents during the time frame of review for this assessment, 2013–2015. All but one remains open, pending a decision by the district attorney on whether the officers' actions were lawful. It is unacceptable for officer-involved shooting investigations to remain open for years.	2.1	SFPD must work with the City and County of San Francisco to develop a process that provides for timely, transparent, and factual outcomes for officer-involved shooting incidents.	Medium	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Lt. Cox	Sgt. Eric Altofer; Sgt. Jayme Cambell; Sgt. Dennis Tommer; Sgt. John Crudo; Lt. Robert Yick
Leadership/ Management Culture	<b>The SFPD and the Police Commission collaboratively worked with community stakeholders to update Department General Order 5.01 - Use of Force policy.</b> Department General Order 5.01 was last revised in 1995. The draft revision, dated June 22, 2016, reflects policy enhancements that progressive police departments across the country have implemented, including incorporating recommendations from the Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing. However, because of collective bargaining practices the policy has not yet been implemented by the Police Commission as of the date of this report.	3.1	The Police Commission, SFPD leadership, and elected officials should work quickly and proactively to ensure that the Department is ready to issue these use of force policies and procedures to all Department employees immediately following the collective bargaining meet and confer process. The process should not be drawn out, because the goal should be immediate implementation once the process has been completed.	Immediate	SFPD Complete/ DOJ Review	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Captain Michael Connolly; Rania Adwan
Leadership/ Management Culture	<b>The SFPD and the Police Commission collaboratively worked with community stakeholders to update Department General Order 5.01 - Use of Force policy.</b> Department General Order 5.01 was last revised in 1995. The draft revision, dated June 22, 2016, reflects policy enhancements that progressive police departments across the country have implemented, including incorporating recommendations from the Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing. However, because of collective bargaining practices the policy has not yet been implemented by the Police Commission as of the date of this report.	3.2	The SFPD should work with the Police Commission to obtain input from the stakeholder group and conduct an after-action review of the meet and confer process to identify ways to improve input and expedite the process in the future for other policy development.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Lt. Gilmore	Rania Adwan
IT/Data Business Processes	<b>The Use of Force Log captures insufficient information about use of force incidents.</b> The SFPD does not have a separate use of force report for personnel to complete after a use of force incident. Rather, the specific articulable facts leading to the force incident are documented in the narrative of a regular incident report form and a paper use of force log, making it difficult to collect accurate and complete data or analyze aggregate use of force data. In addition, it requires staff to manually log the information into the Early Intervention System.	4.1	The SFPD needs to create an electronic use of force reporting system so that data can be captured in real time. (Sgt. Youngblood and Lt. Im are working together on 4.1 and 4.2 as they are interrelated)	Medium	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Sgt. Youngblood	Sgt. Youngblood
IT/Data Business Processes	<b>The Use of Force Log captures insufficient information about use of force incidents.</b> The SFPD does not have a separate use of force report for personnel to complete after a use of force incident. Rather, the specific articulable facts leading to the force incident are documented in the narrative of a regular incident report form and a paper use of force log, making it difficult to collect accurate and complete data or analyze aggregate use of force data. In addition, it requires staff to manually log the information into the Early Intervention System.	4.2	In developing an electronic report system, SFPD must review current practice regarding reporting use of force, including reporting on level of resistance by the individual, level and escalation of control tactics used by the officer, and sequencing of the individual's resistance and control by the officer.	Medium	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Im

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Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The Use of Force Log captures insufficient information about use of force incidents.</b> The SFPD does not have a separate use of force report for personnel to complete after a use of force incident. Rather, the specific articulable facts leading to the force incident are documented in the narrative of a regular incident report form and a paper use of force log, making it difficult to collect accurate and complete data or analyze aggregate use of force data. In addition, it requires staff to manually log the information into the Early Intervention System.	4.4	To facilitate the implementation of Recommendation 4.3, a training bulletin describing the form, its purpose, and how to accurately complete it should accompany the form introduction. The bulletin should be implemented within 90 days of the issuance of this report.	Immediate	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Sgt. Youngblood	Sgt. Youngblood
IT/Data Business Processes	<b>The Use of Force Log captures insufficient information about use of force incidents.</b> The SFPD does not have a separate use of force report for personnel to complete after a use of force incident. Rather, the specific articulable facts leading to the force incident are documented in the narrative of a regular incident report form and a paper use of force log, making it difficult to collect accurate and complete data or analyze aggregate use of force data. In addition, it requires staff to manually log the information into the Early Intervention System.	4.5	The SFPD should continue the manual entry of use of force data until the electronic use of force report is operational. To ensure consistency and accuracy in the data, this entry should be conducted in a single unit rather than multiple units.	High	Awaiting Document Packet	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Sgt. Youngblood	Sgt. Youngblood
Leadership/ Management Culture	<b>The Use of Force Log captures insufficient information about use of force incidents.</b> The SFPD does not have a separate use of force report for personnel to complete after a use of force incident. Rather, the specific articulable facts leading to the force incident are documented in the narrative of a regular incident report form and a paper use of force log, making it difficult to collect accurate and complete data or analyze aggregate use of force data. In addition, it requires staff to manually log the information into the Early Intervention System.	4.6	The SFPD should audit use of force data on a quarterly basis and hold supervisors accountable for ongoing deficiencies.	Immediate	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Sgt. Youngblood	Sgt. Youngblood
Training	<b>The Use of Force Log captures insufficient information about use of force incidents.</b> The SFPD does not have a separate use of force report for personnel to complete after a use of force incident. Rather, the specific articulable facts leading to the force incident are documented in the narrative of a regular incident report form and a paper use of force log, making it difficult to collect accurate and complete data or analyze aggregate use of force data. In addition, it requires staff to manually log the information into the Early Intervention System.	4.7	The SFPD should assign the Training and Education Division to synthesize the issues emerging from the use of force reports and create announcements for roll call on emerging trends. The announcements can include scenarios from incidents that were troubling or complicated in some way and encourage officers to discuss with one another in advance about how they would communicate and approach such situations.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Michelle Jean
Training	<b>The SFPD does not consistently document the types of force used by officers.</b> Out of a sample of more than 500 reported incidents of use of force, only five had documented the type of use of force on the Use of Force Log. Department Bulletin 14-111 – Documenting Use of Force, drafted April 4, 2014, requires officers to document the type and amount of force used, including the use of impact weapons, with supervisors responsible for ensuring compliance with the policy. However, through 2015, the team found that force data remained incomplete. The overall lack of consistent data collection is indicative of limited oversight of force reporting.	5.1	The SFPD needs to develop and train to a consistent reporting policy for use of force.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Sgt. Youngblood	Sgt. Youngblood
Leadership/ Management Culture	<b>The SFPD does not consistently document the types of force used by officers.</b> Out of a sample of more than 500 reported incidents of use of force, only five had documented the type of use of force on the Use of Force Log. Department Bulletin 14-111 – Documenting Use of Force, drafted April 4, 2014, requires officers to document the type and amount of force used, including the use of impact weapons, with supervisors responsible for ensuring compliance with the policy. However, through 2015, the team found that force data remained incomplete. The overall lack of consistent data collection is indicative of limited oversight of force reporting.	5.2	The SFPD needs to hold supervisors and officers accountable for failure to properly document use of force incidents.	High	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Sgt. Eric Altofer; Sgt. Jayme Cambell; Sgt. Dennis Tommer; Sgt. John Crudo; Lt. Robert Yick; Sgt. Stacy Youngblood

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Training	<b>The SFPD has not developed comprehensive formal training specifically related to use of force practices.</b> A number of training issues on emerging operational practices in the SFPD and those highlighted in the <i>Final Report of the President's Task Force of 21st Century Policing</i> , such as de-escalation, have not been adequately addressed.	6.1	The Training and Education Division should adopt and implement a formal Learning Needs Assessment model that identifies and prioritizes training needs, and should subsequently design and present them in the most effective and efficient ways possible.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Im
Training	<b>The SFPD has not developed comprehensive formal training specifically related to use of force practices.</b> A number of training issues on emerging operational practices in the SFPD and those highlighted in the <i>Final Report of the President's Task Force of 21st Century Policing</i> , such as de-escalation, have not been adequately addressed.	6.2	To support policies mandated through recent Department Bulletins, as well as to ensure implementation of best practices and policies outlined in the Final Report of the President's Task Force of 21st Century Policing, The SFPD's Training and Education Division should prepare training on the following topics at minimum: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhanced de-escalation</li> <li>• Sanctity of life</li> <li>• Enhanced service-oriented interactions with homeless individuals</li> <li>• Improved dispatch protocols for cases requiring Crisis Intervention Team response</li> </ul>	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Michelle Jean
IT/Data Business Processes	<b>The SFPD has not developed comprehensive formal training specifically related to use of force practices.</b> A number of training issues on emerging operational practices in the SFPD and those highlighted in the <i>Final Report of the President's Task Force of 21st Century Policing</i> , such as de-escalation, have not been adequately addressed.	6.3	SFPD training records should be fully automated and training data easily accessible.  (Do you have a packet on this - 1004 says complete?)	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Nasrin Taghvaei
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>SFPD officers have not been trained on operational field use of the mandated 36" baton.</b> Department Bulletin 16-071, which was published on April 30, 2016, requires all officers to carry a 36-inch baton as part of their daily uniform requirements. The assessment team was concerned that the Training Academy staff did not have advance knowledge of the baton policy change. During the team's visit, Training Academy staff members were drafting training guidelines for use of the 36-inch baton after the policy had already been issued. There must be good communication before and following the publication of orders that affect daily activities or provide for a change in organizational focus. This would allow for smoother implementation and ensure that appropriate training is available, particularly for key orders.	7.1	The SFPD must develop a policy on the use of the 36-inch baton for the use of interacting with individuals with edged weapons. The policy should also dictate the proper handling of the baton, and the policy should dictate when it's appropriate to use a two-hand stance and when a one-hand approach is needed.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		
Training	<b>SFPD officers have not been trained on operational field use of the mandated 36" baton.</b> Department Bulletin 16-071, which was published on April 30, 2016, requires all officers to carry a 36-inch baton as part of their daily uniform requirements. The assessment team was concerned that the Training Academy staff did not have advance knowledge of the baton policy change. During the team's visit, Training Academy staff members were drafting training guidelines for use of the 36-inch baton after the policy had already been issued. There must be good communication before and following the publication of orders that affect daily activities or provide for a change in organizational focus. This would allow for smoother implementation and ensure that appropriate training is available, particularly for key orders.	7.2	The SFPD must develop training on the use of the 36-inch baton for the use of interacting with individuals with edged weapons. Once developed, the training should be deployed to all officers.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		
Training	<b>SFPD officers have not been trained on operational field use of the mandated 36" baton.</b> Department Bulletin 16-071, which was published on April 30, 2016, requires all officers to carry a 36-inch baton as part of their daily uniform requirements. The assessment team was concerned that the Training Academy staff did not have advance knowledge of the baton policy change. During the team's visit, Training Academy staff members were drafting training guidelines for use of the 36-inch baton after the policy had already been issued. There must be good communication before and following the publication of orders that affect daily activities or provide for a change in organizational focus. This would allow for smoother implementation and ensure that appropriate training is available, particularly for key orders.	7.3	The SFPD should prohibit the use of the 36-inch baton until all officers are properly trained in the intended use.	Immediate	SFPD Complete/DOJ Review	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		

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Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>SFPD supervisors are not required to respond to the scene of all use of force incidents and are not required to fully document their actions.</b> Supervisors are not appropriately tasked in relation to use of force incidents. Supervisors are required to respond to the scene for use of force incidents only when injuries are reported injuries and are not required to document their actions in the incident report. Furthermore, during the review period officers and supervisors continued to inconsistently complete use of force reporting forms.	8.1	The SFPD should immediately require supervisors to respond to events in which officers use force instruments or cause injury, regardless of whether there is a complaint of injury by the individual. This will allow the Department to gain greater oversight of its use of force.	Immediate	In Approval Process	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	DC Hector Sainez	Commander Peter Walsh
Leadership/ Management Culture	<b>SFPD supervisors are not required to respond to the scene of all use of force incidents and are not required to fully document their actions.</b> Supervisors are not appropriately tasked in relation to use of force incidents. Supervisors are required to respond to the scene for use of force incidents only when injuries are reported injuries and are not required to document their actions in the incident report. Furthermore, during the review period officers and supervisors continued to inconsistently complete use of force reporting forms.	8.2	Supervisors should be held accountable for ensuring accurate and complete entry for all use of force data reporting.	Immediate	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Sgt. Youngblood	Sgt. Youngblood
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>SFPD supervisors are not required to respond to the scene of all use of force incidents and are not required to fully document their actions.</b> Supervisors are not appropriately tasked in relation to use of force incidents. Supervisors are required to respond to the scene for use of force incidents only when injuries are reported injuries and are not required to document their actions in the incident report. Furthermore, during the review period officers and supervisors continued to inconsistently complete use of force reporting forms.	8.3	Supervisors should be required to document their actions regarding the investigation of the use of force incident within the incident report. As recommended in this section (Recommendation 3.2), a stand-alone use of force report should be developed, and when completed, should contain a section for supervisory actions relative to the incident and signature.	Medium	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Sgt. Youngblood	Sgt. Youngblood
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD is inconsistent in providing timely notifications to all external oversight partners following an officer-involved shooting.</b> Members of SFPD acknowledged that there are occasionally notification delays because of administrative issues and the time it takes to notify required parties of an incident. Regardless of the reason, delayed notification to key partners means that those partners are not present at the earliest stages of an officer-involved shooting investigation. Notifying external oversight partners, (including the District Attorney and Office of Citizen Complaint [OCC]), promptly allows for timely arrival on the scene and facilitates effective and transparent external oversight of officer-involved shooting investigations.	9.1	The SFPD should work with the Department of Emergency Management to provide it with primary responsibility for timely notification to all stakeholders on the call-out list used immediately after an officer-involved shooting incident.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Capt Hart
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD is inconsistent in providing timely notifications to all external oversight partners following an officer-involved shooting.</b> Members of SFPD acknowledged that there are occasionally notification delays because of administrative issues and the time it takes to notify required parties of an incident. Regardless of the reason, delayed notification to key partners means that those partners are not present at the earliest stages of an officer-involved shooting investigation. Notifying external oversight partners, (including the District Attorney and Office of Citizen Complaint [OCC]), promptly allows for timely arrival on the scene and facilitates effective and transparent external oversight of officer-involved shooting investigations.	9.2	Until the Department of Emergency Management protocol is established, when activating the protocols for notification following an officer-involved shooting incident, the Operations Center should notify representatives of IAD, the District Attorney's Office, and OCC, with no lag time occurring in any of the notifications. The Operations Center log for notifications should be included as part of the investigation report case file to accurately and fully depict notifications.	Immediate	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Capt. Jack Hart, Lt. Mike Deeley
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD is inconsistent in providing timely notifications to all external oversight partners following an officer-involved shooting.</b> Members of SFPD acknowledged that there are occasionally notification delays because of administrative issues and the time it takes to notify required parties of an incident. Regardless of the reason, delayed notification to key partners means that those partners are not present at the earliest stages of an officer-involved shooting investigation. Notifying external oversight partners, (including the District Attorney and Office of Citizen Complaint [OCC]), promptly allows for timely arrival on the scene and facilitates effective and transparent external oversight of officer-involved shooting investigations.	9.3	All notified responders should be required to notify the Department of Emergency management of the time of their arrival. This will create a comprehensive permanent record of the time of notifications and responses of the units to the scene.	Immediate	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Capt. Jack Hart, Lt. Mike Deeley

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Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>There is a lack of coordination and collaboration for responding to and investigating an officer-involved shooting.</b> The SFPD's investigative protocols are comparable to those followed by other professional, major city police departments. However, IAD staff members, along with some of SFPD's partners, such as members of the District Attorney's Office and the OCC assigned to respond to such incidents, are not as integrated. Lack of collaboration and cooperation in investigating officer-involved shooting incidents can undermine procedural justice and transparency for the Department. The SFPD needs to develop protocols and memoranda of agreement to ensure the highest level of cooperation and oversight into the investigation of officer-involved shooting incidents. Joint training protocols ensuring all parties are appropriately trained and working to the highest professional standards should become a matter of routine practice. These protocol agreements and practices will become more important as OCC assumes its responsibility to independently investigate SFPD officer-involved shooting incidents. The team will monitor the implementation of the new law during the CRI-TA implementation phase.	10.1	The SFPD should establish a formal protocol to ensure that a representative of the Homicide Detail provides OCC and District Attorney's Office investigators a timely briefing about the facts of the case and to make arrangements for a formal walk-through or gain investigative access to the incident scene as soon as possible. The highest-ranking officer on the scene should be responsible for ensuring compliance with this recommendation. <b>(Do you have a packet on this - 1004 says complete?)</b>	High	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Lt. Yu	A/Capt. Braconi
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>There is a lack of coordination and collaboration for responding to and investigating an officer-involved shooting.</b> The SFPD's investigative protocols are comparable to those followed by other professional, major city police departments. However, IAD staff members, along with some of SFPD's partners, such as members of the District Attorney's Office and the OCC assigned to respond to such incidents, are not as integrated. Lack of collaboration and cooperation in investigating officer-involved shooting incidents can undermine procedural justice and transparency for the Department. The SFPD needs to develop protocols and memoranda of agreement to ensure the highest level of cooperation and oversight into the investigation of officer-involved shooting incidents. Joint training protocols ensuring all parties are appropriately trained and working to the highest professional standards should become a matter of routine practice. These protocol agreements and practices will become more important as OCC assumes its responsibility to independently investigate SFPD officer-involved shooting incidents. The team will monitor the implementation of the new law during the CRI-TA implementation phase.	10.2	The SFPD should work with its accountability partners the OCC and the District Attorney's Office in officer-involved shootings to develop a formal training program in which representatives of the District Attorney's Office, SFPD Homicide Detail, and the OCC engage in regular training regarding best practices for investigating such cases. This training should be developed and implemented within 120 days of the issuance of this report.	Immediate	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Captain O'Brien
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The Firearm Discharge Review Board is limited in scope and fails to identify policy, training, or other tactical considerations.</b> The FDRB is a good practice but has devolved to essentially determining whether the shooting officer's actions were consistent in policy. However, several other layers of authority also conduct this determination. The FDRB is better served following its policy mandate to ensure that the Department is continually reviewing its training, policy, and procedures as they relate to officer-involved shooting incidents.	11.1	SFPD should update the Department General Order 3.10— Firearm Discharge Review Board to require written evaluation of policy, training, and tactical considerations of discharge incidents, specifically identifying whether the incident was influenced by a failure of policy, training, or tactics and should include recommendations for addressing any issues identified.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Sgt. Angela Wilhelm	

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Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The Firearm Discharge Review Board is limited in scope and fails to identify policy, training, or other tactical considerations.</b> The FDRB is a good practice but has devolved to essentially determining whether the shooting officer's actions were consistent in policy. However, several other layers of authority also conduct this determination. The FDRB is better served following its policy mandate to ensure that the Department is continually reviewing its training, policy, and procedures as they relate to officer-involved shooting incidents.	11.3	The SFPD should update the DGO to ensure that the FDRB is staffed with the training and education division representative as an advisory member to ensure an appropriate focus on development of responsive training protocols.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Sgt. Angela Wilhelm	
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The Firearm Discharge Review Board is limited in scope and fails to identify policy, training, or other tactical considerations.</b> The FDRB is a good practice but has devolved to essentially determining whether the shooting officer's actions were consistent in policy. However, several other layers of authority also conduct this determination. The FDRB is better served following its policy mandate to ensure that the Department is continually reviewing its training, policy, and procedures as they relate to officer-involved shooting incidents.	11.4	Officer-involved shooting events need to be reviewed in a more timely fashion as it relates to policy, training, and procedures. The FDRB should review incidents at the conclusion of the IAD investigation rather than waiting for the District Attorney's letter of declination for charging of an officer-involved shooting incident, which can take up to two years.	Medium	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Lt Cox	Lt. Cox/Sgt. Dennis Toomer
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD has significantly expanded its Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training program; however, SFPD does not have a strong operations protocol for CIT response.</b> Crisis Intervention Team training instructs officers how to effectively manage behavioral crisis situations in the field. Since February 2015, all recruits complete the 40-hour Crisis Intervention Team training before they leave the Academy. As of March 2016, 593 members- 27 percent of the department have received crisis intervention training (CIT). Although there is a policy that supervisors are to be requested at the scene of an incident wherein a member of the public in mental health crisis is armed, more must be in place to address such situations. The team learned that CIT-trained officers are not pre-identified to facilitate their assignment to calls related to persons in mental health crisis. However, given the data issues facing SFPD, the ability to clearly track and confirm policy adherence for identifying CIT-trained officers remains an issue.	12.1	SFPD should work with the Department of Emergency Management to ensure sound CIT protocols, namely the following: • Ensure that dispatchers are notified at the beginning of each shift which units have CIT trained officers assigned so they are appropriately dispatched to calls for persons with mental health disabilities. • Develop protocols to ensure that mental health crisis calls for service are answered by intake personnel at the Department of Emergency Management and the information is appropriately relayed to field personnel. <b>(Do you have a packet on this - 1004 says complete?)</b>	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Molina
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD has significantly expanded its Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training program; however, SFPD does not have a strong operations protocol for CIT response.</b> Crisis Intervention Team training instructs officers how to effectively manage behavioral crisis situations in the field. Since February 2015, all recruits complete the 40-hour Crisis Intervention Team training before they leave the Academy. As of March 2016, 593 members- 27 percent of the department have received crisis intervention training (CIT). Although there is a policy that supervisors are to be requested at the scene of an incident wherein a member of the public in mental health crisis is armed, more must be in place to address such situations. The team learned that CIT-trained officers are not pre-identified to facilitate their assignment to calls related to persons in mental health crisis. However, given the data issues facing SFPD, the ability to clearly track and confirm policy adherence for identifying CIT-trained officers remains an issue.	12.2	SFPD should ensure an appropriate distribution of CIT trained personnel across all shifts in all districts. <b>(Do you have a packet on this - 1004 says complete?)</b>	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Craig

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Training	<b>The SFPD has significantly expanded its Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training program; however, SFPD does not have a strong operations protocol for CIT response.</b> Crisis Intervention Team training instructs officers how to effectively manage behavioral crisis situations in the field. Since February 2015, all recruits complete the 40-hour Crisis Intervention Team training before they leave the Academy. As of March 2016, 593 members- 27 percent of the department have received crisis intervention training (CIT). Although there is a policy that supervisors are to be requested at the scene of an incident wherein a member of the public in mental health crisis is armed, more must be in place to address such situations. The team learned that CIT-trained officers are not pre-identified to facilitate their assignment to calls related to persons in mental health crisis. However, given the data issues facing SFPD, the ability to clearly track and confirm policy adherence for identifying CIT-trained officers remains an issue.	12.3	Newly promoted supervisors should also receive CIT training as part of their training for their new assignments. <b>(Do you have a packet on this - 1004 says complete?)</b>	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. William Wilfred
Community Policing	<b>The SFPD engages with the community following an officer-involved shooting incident through a town hall meeting in the community where the event occurred.</b> The town hall meetings following an officer-involved shooting in the relevant neighborhood is a promising practice.	13.1	The practice of hosting a town hall meeting in the community shortly after the incident should continue with a focus on only releasing known facts.	Immediate	SFPD Complete/DOJ Review	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Arline Gilmore; Christine Fountain; Sgt. Andraychak
Community Policing	<b>The SFPD does not have a strategy to engage with the broader community following a fatal officer involved shooting until its conclusion.</b> The SFPD does not keep as active an engagement during the investigative process, and consideration should be given to publishing findings once an investigation is completed to ensure community closure.	14.1	The SFPD should develop an ongoing communication strategy for officer involved shootings.	High	SFPD Complete/DOJ Review	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		PM - Sgt. Andraychak
Community Policing	<b>The SFPD does not have a strategy to engage with the broader community following a fatal officer involved shooting until its conclusion.</b> The SFPD does not keep as active an engagement during the investigative process, and consideration should be given to publishing findings once an investigation is completed to ensure community closure.	14.2	The SFPD should ensure that media outreach is immediate and that information conveyed is succinct and accurate.	Immediate	SFPD Complete/DOJ Review	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Arline Gilmore; Christine Fountain; Sgt. Andraychak
Community Policing	<b>The SFPD does not have a strategy to engage with the broader community following a fatal officer involved shooting until its conclusion.</b> The SFPD does not keep as active an engagement during the investigative process, and consideration should be given to publishing findings once an investigation is completed to ensure community closure.	14.3	The SFPD should use social media as a tool to relay critical and relevant information during the progression of the investigation.	Immediate	In Approval Process	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Arline Gilmore; Christine Fountain; Sgt. Andraychak
Community Policing	<b>The SFPD does not adequately educate the public and the media on issues related to use of force and officer-involved shootings.</b>	15.1	The SFPD needs to create outreach materials related to educating the public and the media on use of force and officer-involved shooting investigations and protocols. These materials should be disseminated widely through the various community engagement events and district station meetings.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		PM - Commander Walsh and Sgt. Andraychak
Community Policing	<b>The SFPD does not adequately educate the public and the media on issues related to use of force and officer-involved shootings.</b>	15.2	The SFPD should host town hall presentations to educate the public and the media on use of force and officer-involved shooting investigations and protocols.	Low	SFPD Complete/DOJ Review	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		PM - Sgt. Andraychak
Community Policing	<b>Currently, SFPD officers are not authorized to carry electronic control weapons (ECW, i.e., Tasers).</b> These tools are less-lethal weapons that are meant to help control persons who are acting aggressively. Many police agencies use these tools and report that they have helped reduce injury to officers and community members and lead to fewer officer-involved shootings. Promising practices suggest that the use of ECWs can result in less use of force.	16.1	Working with all key stakeholders and community members, the SFPD and the Police Commission should make an informed decision based on expectations, sentiment, and information from top experts in the country.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	A/Capt Carl Fabbri	Rania Adwan
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>Currently, SFPD officers are not authorized to carry electronic control weapons (ECW, i.e., Tasers).</b> These tools are less-lethal weapons that are meant to help control persons who are acting aggressively. Many police agencies use these tools and report that they have helped reduce injury to officers and community members and lead to fewer officer-involved shootings. Promising practices suggest that the use of ECWs can result in less use of force.	16.2	The City and County of San Francisco should strongly consider deploying ECWs.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	A/Capt Carl Fabbri	

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Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>Currently, the SFPD authorizes personnel to use the carotid restraint technique.</b> This technique poses a significant risk in the community and is not a routinely adopted force option in many law enforcement agencies. Contemporary policing discussions regarding use of force suggest that police agencies should carefully weigh any perceived benefit of the use of carotid restraint against potential harm. It is challenging to maintain the appropriate leverage and placement in close-encounter struggles, thereby increasing the risk on an unintended, harmful outcome. The department's pending draft order on use of force would eliminate the use of the carotid restraint.	17.1	The SFPD should immediately prohibit the carotid restraint technique as a use of force option.	Immediate	SFPD Complete/DOJ Review	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Arline Gilmore; Christine Fountain; Sgt. Andraychak
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD does not adequately investigate officer use of force.</b> At present, the level of investigations in the SFPD is not sufficient as it relates to officer use of force. There is minimal documentation of witnesses, no separate or summarized interview of witnesses, no routine collection of photographic evidence, and minimal analysis of the event from an evidentiary standpoint. If a supervisor does not respond, then it falls to the officer who used force to complete the investigation, which is unacceptable.	18.1	The SFPD needs to develop a policy for investigation standards and response for all officer use of force.	Medium	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Captain Jaimerena	Captain Jaimerena/Sgt. Moreno
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD does not adequately investigate officer use of force.</b> At present, the level of investigations in the SFPD is not sufficient as it relates to officer use of force. There is minimal documentation of witnesses, no separate or summarized interview of witnesses, no routine collection of photographic evidence, and minimal analysis of the event from an evidentiary standpoint. If a supervisor does not respond, then it falls to the officer who used force to complete the investigation, which is unacceptable.	18.2	The SFPD should create an on-scene checklist for use of force incidents.	Medium	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander	Sgt. Youngblood	Sgt. Youngblood
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD does not adequately investigate officer use of force.</b> At present, the level of investigations in the SFPD is not sufficient as it relates to officer use of force. There is minimal documentation of witnesses, no separate or summarized interview of witnesses, no routine collection of photographic evidence, and minimal analysis of the event from an evidentiary standpoint. If a supervisor does not respond, then it falls to the officer who used force to complete the investigation, which is unacceptable.	18.3	The SFPD needs to develop a protocol for proper development and handling of officer statements.	Medium	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Mike Nevin
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD does not maintain complete and consistent officer-involved shooting files.</b> The SFPD maintains two separate officer-involved shooting files, one with the Homicide Detail and one with IAD. The files are incomplete with no consistent report structure. The team encountered a lack of consistency as to the investigations as well. The fact that some investigative evidence is digital while other evidence is still in paper format may contribute to this inconsistency. Because Homicide Detail and IAD do not share protocols or standards for investigations of officer-involved shooting incidents, there is likelihood that evidence will not be properly identified or assessed, particularly with dual investigative approaches. Photos, crime scene logs, and video collection were referenced in many reports. However, these items were inventoried elsewhere without copies in the investigative files. Investigative files did not contain preliminary finding reports or draft reports—even files that were years old. Within Homicide Detail, many files contained an initial summary report but did not document basic records of who was called to attend the scene or who was on the scene.	19.1	The SFPD needs to develop a standard officer-involved shooting protocol within 90 days of the release of this report.	Immediate	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		A/Capt. Braconi

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Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD does not maintain complete and consistent officer-involved shooting files.</b> The SFPD maintains two separate officer-involved shooting files, one with the Homicide Detail and one with IAD. The files are incomplete with no consistent report structure. The team encountered a lack of consistency as to the investigations as well. The fact that some investigative evidence is digital while other evidence is still in paper format may contribute to this inconsistency. Because Homicide Detail and IAD do not share protocols or standards for investigations of officer-involved shooting incidents, there is likelihood that evidence will not be properly identified or assessed, particularly with dual investigative approaches. Photos, crime scene logs, and video collection were referenced in many reports. However, these items were inventoried elsewhere without copies in the investigative files. Investigative files did not contain preliminary finding reports or draft reports—even files that were years old. Within Homicide Detail, many files contained an initial summary report but did not document basic records of who was called to attend the scene or who was on the scene.	19.2	The SFPD needs to create a template for all officer-involved shooting files. This template should detail report structure and handling of evidence. SFPD should refer to Officer-Involved Shootings: A Guide for Law Enforcement Leaders.	Medium	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		A/Capt. Braconi
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD does not maintain complete and consistent officer-involved shooting files.</b> The SFPD maintains two separate officer-involved shooting files, one with the Homicide Detail and one with IAD. The files are incomplete with no consistent report structure. The team encountered a lack of consistency as to the investigations as well. The fact that some investigative evidence is digital while other evidence is still in paper format may contribute to this inconsistency. Because Homicide Detail and IAD do not share protocols or standards for investigations of officer-involved shooting incidents, there is likelihood that evidence will not be properly identified or assessed, particularly with dual investigative approaches. Photos, crime scene logs, and video collection were referenced in many reports. However, these items were inventoried elsewhere without copies in the investigative files. Investigative files did not contain preliminary finding reports or draft reports—even files that were years old. Within Homicide Detail, many files contained an initial summary report but did not document basic records of who was called to attend the scene or who was on the scene.	19.3	The SFPD should ensure that all officer-involved shooting investigations are appropriately reviewed by all levels of supervision.	Immediate	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Captain O'Brien, Lt. Arline Gilmore; Christine Fountain; Sgt. Andraychak
IT/Data Business Processes	<b>The SFPD does not capture sufficient data on arrest and use of force incidents to support strong scientific analysis.</b> Because of limitations in the manner in which use of force and arrest data were collected by the SFPD, assessment team members were unable to perform a multivariate frequency analysis, which would have shed light on whether individuals who are members of racial minorities were subjected to force more often than White individuals during arrests.	20.1	The SFPD needs to develop reliable electronic in-custody arrest data. It needs to ensure that these arrest data accurately reflect the incident number from the event, and the number should be cross-referenced on both the booking card and the use of force reporting form.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Greg Mar/Brussow
IT/Data Business Processes	<b>The SFPD does not capture sufficient data on arrest and use of force incidents to support strong scientific analysis.</b> Because of limitations in the manner in which use of force and arrest data were collected by the SFPD, assessment team members were unable to perform a multivariate frequency analysis, which would have shed light on whether individuals who are members of racial minorities were subjected to force more often than White individuals during arrests.	20.2	The SFPD needs to audit arrest data and use of force data monthly to ensure proper recording of use of force incidents related to arrest incidents. An audit of these data should occur immediately upon publication of this report and monthly thereafter.	Immediate	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		PM - Captain Walsh
IT/Data Business Processes	<b>The SFPD does not capture sufficient data on arrest and use of force incidents to support strong scientific analysis.</b> Because of limitations in the manner in which use of force and arrest data were collected by the SFPD, assessment team members were unable to perform a multivariate frequency analysis, which would have shed light on whether individuals who are members of racial minorities were subjected to force more often than White individuals during arrests.	20.3	The SFPD needs to advocate for better coordination with the San Francisco Sheriff's Department to ensure that the recording of SFPD arrest data is accurate and corresponds with SFPD incident report and arrest data.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Greg Mar/Brussow
IT/Data Business Processes	<b>The SFPD does not capture sufficient data on arrest and use of force incidents to support strong scientific analysis.</b> Because of limitations in the manner in which use of force and arrest data were collected by the SFPD, assessment team members were unable to perform a multivariate frequency analysis, which would have shed light on whether individuals who are members of racial minorities were subjected to force more often than White individuals during arrests.	20.4	The SFPD should identify a research partner to further refine its use of force data collection and to explore the data findings of this report to identify appropriate data for measurement and to determine causal factors.	Low	SFPD Complete/DOJ Review	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		PM - Captain Walsh

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IT/Data Business Processes	<b>Community members' race or ethnicity was not significantly associated with the severity of force used or injury arising from an officer's use of force.</b>	21.1	The SFPD should continue to collect and analyze use of force data to identify patterns and trends over time consistent with recommendations in finding 20.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		
IT/Data Business Processes	<b>When only minority officers were involved in a use of force incident, the severity of force used and the injuries sustained by community members increased.</b>	22.1	The SFPD needs to improve data collection on use of force so that further analysis can be conducted to better understand this finding.	Low	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD allows members to shoot at moving vehicles under certain circumstances pursuant to Department General Order 5.02 – Use of Firearms.</b> SFPD policy provides for a variety of exceptions that allow officers to shoot at a moving vehicle, which effectively nullifies the general statement that officers are prohibited from discharging their firearm at the operator or occupant of a moving vehicle. The department's pending draft order on use of force allows shooting at vehicles when there is an immediate threat of death or injury by means other than the vehicle.	23.1	The SFPD should immediately implement this provision of the draft policy.	Immediate	In Approval Process	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Lt. Arline Gilmore; Christine Fountain; Sgt. Andraychak
Doctrine/ Policy Development	<b>The SFPD allows members to shoot at moving vehicles under certain circumstances pursuant to Department General Order 5.02 – Use of Firearms.</b> SFPD policy provides for a variety of exceptions that allow officers to shoot at a moving vehicle, which effectively nullifies the general statement that officers are prohibited from discharging their firearm at the operator or occupant of a moving vehicle. The department's pending draft order on use of force allows shooting at vehicles when there is an immediate threat of death or injury by means other than the vehicle.	23.2	The FDRB should be tasked with review of all prior officer-involved shooting and discharge incidents in which firearms are discharged at a moving vehicle to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· evaluate and identify commonalities with recommendations for policy and training as a result of the review;</li> <li>· oversee training and policy development aimed at eliminating the need for such actions;</li> <li>· report to the Police Commission about the outcomes of the review and the actions taken to overcome those situations that contribute to such incidents.</li> </ul>	Medium	In Progress	Chief of Staff	Peter Walsh, Commander		Rania Adwan, Captain McFadden